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1
Courts, Clergy, and Congregations:  
Disputes between Religious Institutions and their Leaders 
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle1 
In any systematic consideration of church autonomy, the judicial role in resolving 
disputes between religious institutions and their leaders is inevitably a central topic. Thus far, the 
constitutional debate over the rules to guide such disputes has revealed a number of conventional 
starting places.  The obvious location in which to begin is the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment.  The choice of leaders for religious organizations quite obviously represents the 
exercise of religion, and one would expect that arguments designed to insulate such 
organizations from regulation, potential liabilities, or other potentially coercive state policies 
with respect to these leaders would find their locus in that provision of the First Amendment.2   
                                                 
1 The authors are both on the law faculty of The George Washington University.  Ira C. 
Lupu is the F. Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor of Law; Robert W. Tuttle is Professor of Law 
and the David R. and Sherry Kirschner Berz Research Professor of Law and Religion. 
2 One prominent early work taking this position was Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in 
the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 
Colum. L. Rev. 1514 (1979); see also Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward A Constitutional 
Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 99; Angela Carmella, Houses of 
Worship and Religious Liberty: Constitutional Limits to Landmark Preservation and 
Architectural Review, 36 Vill. L. Rev. 401 (1991).  A more recent incarnation of this argument 
can be found in Kathleen Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising 
Lessons of Smith, 2004 B.Y.U. L. Rev.1633, and Joshua Dunlap, Note: When Big Brother Plays 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1270706
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The second common reference point in this conversation is the concept of “excessive 
entanglement” in the “internal affairs” of religious organizations.    Courts have rested the 
concern about constitutionally impermissible entanglement on both the Free Exercise Clause and 
the Establishment Clause.3  Commentators, typically emphasizing the Establishment Clause, 
have developed various accounts of a special privilege or freedom for religious entities.4   
We think that the emphasis on the Establishment Clause, and the focus on entanglement, 
represent a step in the right direction.  The conceptual focus of anti-entanglement arguments is 
on the role of the state in its regulatory capacity, rather than on the status of religious entities as 
                                                                                                                                                             
God: The Religion Clauses, Title VII, and the Ministerial Exception, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
2005 (2007). 
3 See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Rayburn 
v. General Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F. 2d 1164 (4th Circuit 1985). 
4 Douglas Laycock, Toward A General Theory of the Establishment Clause: The Case of 
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1373 (1981); 
Gregory Kalscheur, Civil Procedure and the Establishment Clause: Exploring the Ministerial 
Exception, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and the Freedom of the Church, ___ W & M Bill of Rts. 
J. ___ (forthcoming 2008); Carl H. Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental 
Interference with Religious Organizations, 41 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 347 (1984); Carl H. Esbeck, 
The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 1 
(1998); Richard W. Garnett, The Freedom of the Church, 4 J. Cath. Soc. Thought 23 (2007); 
Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over Religious Property, 98 
Colum. L. Rev. 1843  (1998). 
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the holders of unique rights.  For reasons we have begun to develop elsewhere5 and hope to 
refine further below, we believe that focus on the state side of the ledger is likely to prove far 
more fruitful than an inquiry that begins with the idea that religious entities have special rights.   
Although the Free Exercise Clause has a rights-bearing function,6 the Religion Clauses are 
primarily jurisdictional,7 limiting government to the secular and temporal, and foreclosing 
government from exercising authority over the spiritual domain.  It is that very basic premise that 
both explains and limits the legal autonomy of religious institutions. 
                                                 
5 Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our 
Constitutional Order, 47 Vill. L. Rev. 37 (2002); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual 
Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, 2004 Brigham Young University Law Review 1789. 
6  We plan to develop in future work the idea that the free exercise clause protects 
primarily the right to worship, proselytize, and associate for religious purposes.  The expansion 
of the first amendment’s freedoms of speech and association has tended to overlap with and 
perhaps crowd out these core concerns of the free exercise clause, and have pushed judges and 
others into the error of focusing on conduct exemptions as being a central mandate of the free 
exercise clause. 
7  We do not mean this in the federal-state sense advanced by Steven D. Smith, 
Foreordained Failure:  The Quest for a Constitutional Principle of Religious Freedom (Oxford U. 
Press 1995) (arguing that the purpose of the Religion Clauses was to exclude the federal 
government from the subject of religion, thereby leaving it to the states). We tackle the problem 
of the Religion Clauses and federalism in Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Federalism and Faith, 
55 Emory L. Rev. 19 (2006).  
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The context of employment relations between religious entities and their leaders is an 
especially illuminating prism through which to perceive this jurisdictional understanding, and its 
implications for the autonomy of religious organizations.  We begin with a question that has a 
well-developed answer in the positive law but an insufficiently theorized explanation. To what 
extent does the Constitution immunize religious entities from legal claims by their own clergy 
and other spokespersons for the faith?8    This question may appear in a wide variety of contexts.  
Those acting in the role of clergy or related roles have brought claims against their employers for 
acts of discrimination,9 defamation,10 violation of fair labor standards laws,11 breach of 
                                                 
8 A number of scholars have criticized this immunity.  See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, 
Above the Law?  The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination 
Law, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1965 (2007); Joanne C. Brant, “Our Shield Belongs to the Lord”: 
Religious Employers and a Constitutional Right to Discriminate, 21 Hastings Con. L. Q. 275 
(1994); Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for Applying 
Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 Corn. L. Rev. 1049 (1966).  Others have 
defended it, See Bagni, note xx supra; Kalscheur, note xx supra;  Notre Dame Note, note 2 supra.  
9  There are a great many decisions of this character.  See, e.g., Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 
F.3d 198 (2d Cir. Conn. 2008) (exemption from race discrimination claim); Rayburn v. General 
Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. Md. 1985) (gender and race 
discrimination);  Combs v. Central Tex. Annual Conf. of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 
343 (5th Cir. Tex. 1999) (pregnancy discrimination); Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 
N.Y. 2006) (age discrimination); Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. La. 1999) (disability 
discrimination); Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. Ill. 
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employment contract,12 and many other causes of action arising out of the employment relation.   
In some but not all of these situations, courts have held that the Constitution bars the asserted 
claims against religious organizations.13 
 The most common type of lawsuit brought by clergy against their employers involves 
statutory claims of discrimination.   Although religious organizations are explicitly exempt from 
most statutory bans on religious discrimination in hiring,14 they are not similarly exempt by 
                                                                                                                                                             
2003) (national origin discrimination). 
10  See, e.g., Kraft v. Rector, Churchwardens & Vestry of Grace Church, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 4234 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2004); El-Farra v. Sayyed, 365 Ark. 209 (Ark. 2006). 
11  Schleicher v. The Salvation Army, __ F.3d __ (7th Cir. 2008) (rejecting minimum 
wage claim as barred by ministerial exception); Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater 
Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. Md. 2004), rehearing en banc denied,  Shaliehsabou v. 
Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 369 F.3d 797 (4th Cir. 2004). 
12  See, e.g., Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 282 
U.S. App. D.C. 314 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
13  Compare Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 
(4th Cir. Md. 1985) (finding that constitution immunizes religious entity against sex 
discrimination claim) with Bollard v. California Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940 
(9th Cir. Cal. 1999) (constitution does not immunize religious entity against sexual harassment 
claim). 
14 Section 702(a) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-1(a)) expressly 
exempts religious organizations from the prohibition on religious discrimination in employment.  
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statute from prohibitions on discrimination based on race, sex, disability, or age.15  Beginning in 
1972, however, and continuing since then, courts have held that such statutory prohibitions are 
subject to a “ministerial exception.”  Judges sometimes describe this exception as a rule of 
interpretation;16 more frequently, they characterize it as a constitutional rule.17  Although the 
Supreme Court has never addressed the questions raised by the “ministerial exception,” every 
federal circuit court has embraced some version of it,18 and no court – federal or state – has ever 
                                                                                                                                                             
Many state civil rights laws have comparable exemptions.  For a collection of the state 
provisions, see  Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Government Partnerships with Faith-Based 
Service Providers: The State of the Law,” The Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare 
Policy, Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government, SUNY (December, 2002), Appendix B. 
15 If Congress adds sexual orientation to the grounds of discrimination forbidden by Title 
VII,   an exemption for religious entities will probably be included.  See H.R. xxxx, sec. 6.  
16 Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2008).  
17 Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 
Md. 1985). 
18  Natal v. Christian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575 (1st Cir. P.R. 1989); 
Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2008); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294 (3d 
Cir. 2006); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000); Starkman v. Evans, 
198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999); Cline v. Catholic Diocese, 206 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 1999); Young v. 
Northern Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 1994); Scharon v. 
St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991); Werft v. Desert 
Southwest Annual Conf., 377 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2004); Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the 
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explicitly rejected the exception. 
 In what follows, we offer a view of the “ministerial exception,” and other doctrines 
relating to the employment of clergy, that focuses on why courts are excluded from adjudicating 
certain questions that frequently affect religious entities.  Put most straightforwardly, our central 
premises are that the Constitution does not systematically protect the interests of certain classes 
of parties, defined by religious mission; rather, the Constitution disables civil courts from 
resolving certain classes of questions.  This is an adjudicative disability,19 not a right of 
autonomy, and it rest on the Establishment Clause alone.  Religious entities are the beneficiaries 
of such an adjudicative disability, but they are not the holders of primary rights to determine 
their own affairs in the face of contrary state interests.  As we hope to convince the reader, this 
                                                                                                                                                             
Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648 (10th Cir. 2002); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal 
Church, 203 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2000); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 317 U.S. App. D.C. 
343 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
19 For reasons we unpack in Part III, infra, we think “disability” is the key term.  We use 
it in the  Hohfeldian sense; see Wesley Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L. J. 16 (1913).  Hohfeld’s argued that “disability” and 
“immunity” are jural correlatives, in the same way as “duty” and “right” (that is, one implies the 
other).  Id. at xxx.  If (as we argue below) courts are disabled from adjudicating certain 
questions, those defendants who might have been found liable had those questions been 
answered are immune from such findings.  So understood, immunity from adjudication with 
respect to an activity is not the same concept as a right to engage in a particular activity, at the 
expense of someone to whom the actor has a legal duty not to so behave. 
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theory is not simply a hot-house translation of existing law into fancy academic terms; the theory 
matters in the disposition of cases.   
The paper proceeds as follows.  Part I outlines the development of the ministerial 
exception in the courts, including the three, overlapping First Amendment stories on which 
courts have relied to justify the exception.  Part II critiques the first two of those three theories -- 
institutional exemptions, and a party-based autonomy of churches over "internal affairs."  Part II 
argues that a free exercise-based doctrine of institutional exemptions from regulation cannot 
justify the “ministerial exemption” in its present form, and that a sweeping theory of party-based 
autonomy for the "internal affairs" of religious entities cannot be persuasively defended.  Part II 
concludes that neither the free exercise clause -- before or after Employment Division v. Smith20 
-- nor a general doctrine of church autonomy is a sound constitutional platform for the 
ministerial exception and related limitations on the adjudication of disputes between religious 
institutions and their leaders.   
 Part III turns to our own account of the ministerial exception.  Our theory of question-
based adjudicative disability focuses on the content of the relevant legal questions rather than the 
identity of the parties or the weight of respective state and private interests. Proceeding through a 
set of real and hypothetical cases -- including those which are easy calls for or against the 
exercise of civil jurisdiction, and others which involve close judgments -- we demonstrate the 
normative superiority of an account that emphasizes the state’s limited jurisprudential 
competence rather than the unique rights of religious organizations. 
 I.  The Ministerial Exception 
                                                 
20 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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 It should come as no surprise that what is now known as the “ministerial exception” arose 
initially in the context of claims that religious organizations were discriminating on the basis of 
sex.  Many orthodox Western faiths, including the oldest denominations of Christianity, Judaism, 
and Islam, have for centuries limited ordination of clergy to males.  A judicial conclusion that the 
prohibition on sex discrimination in employment should apply in full force to these faiths would 
have seemed like a radical (and, for most lawmakers, unintended) consequence of the civil rights 
revolution. 
 What does come as a surprise to many when they first learn of the judge-made 
“ministerial exception” to civil rights laws is that no decisions on the subject have ever involved 
these orthodox, overt, and, explicit exclusions of females from the ranks of clergy.21  Instead, 
virtually every judicial ruling on the subject has involved jobs for which religious organizations 
have made the relevant protected class (women, racial minorities, etc.) formally eligible.   
 The germinal case for the “ministerial exception” is McClure v. Salvation Army,22 
decided by the Fifth Circuit in 1972.  As described by the Court of Appeals, Mrs. Billie McClure 
                                                 
21 Challenges to the gendered quality of the clergy in orthodox faiths have always come 
from within the faith, and tend to be based on theological, rather than legal, grounds.  For 
example, although most discussions of current disputes within the Episcopal Church have tended 
to focus on homosexuality, the Anglican tradition continues to be divided on the question of 
women’s ordination, and the 2006 election of Katharine Jefferts Schori as Presiding Bishop of 
the Episcopal Church in the U.S.A. has exacerbated those tensions.  See Jason Byassee, Splitting 
Up: Anglican Angst, Christian Century, May 20, 2008. 
22 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972). 
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had been commissioned by the Salvation Army in 1967.23 The Army terminated her officer 
status after she held several assignments in the Southern Territory, and McClure then brought a 
civil action under section 703(a) of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.24  McClure alleged 
that she had received less salary and benefits than her male counterparts, and that she had been 
fired for complaining to superiors and to the EEOC about these disparities.25 
As framed by the Court of Appeals, McClure’s suit raised the question whether “the 
application of . . . Title VII to the relationship between . . . a church and its minister violate either 
of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.”26  The Court of Appeals invoked Supreme 
Court precedents under both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause,27 and drew 
extensively on a line of decisions in which the Supreme Court had refused to intervene in 
                                                 
23  Id. at 555. 
24  42 U.S.C. sec 2000e-2(a)(2000). 
25 The district court dismissed the action based on Section 702, 42 U.S.C. sec 2000e-
1(a)(2000),which states that “this subchapter shall not apply . . . to a religious corporation, 
association, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to 
perform work connected with the carrying on . . . of its religious activities.”   The court of 
appeals, after examining the legislative history of this section, concluded that it applied only to 
religious selectivity in hiring, and not to other prohibited grounds of discrimination, such as that 
based on sex, race, or national origin.  Id. at 558. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. (citing, inter alia, Everson v. Bd of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) and Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).  
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disputes involving church property and ecclesiastical personnel.28  After describing the 
relationship “between the organized church and its ministers” as “its lifeblood,”29 and noting 
that the “minister is the chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose,”30 the 
Court offered this analysis of the question presented:31 
An application of the provisions of Title VII to the employment relationship 
which exists between The Salvation Army and Mrs. McClure, a church and its 
minister, would involve an investigation and review of these practices and 
decisions and would, as a result, cause the State to intrude upon matters of church 
administration and government which have so many times before been 
proclaimed to be matters of a singular ecclesiastical concern. Control of strictly 
ecclesiastical matters could easily pass from the church to the State. The church 
would then be without the power to decide for itself, free from state interference, 
matters of church administration and government. 
 Moreover, in addition to injecting the State into substantive ecclesiastical 
matters, an investigation and review of such matters of church administration and 
government as a minister's salary, his place of assignment and his duty, which 
involve a person at the heart of any religious organization, could only produce by 
its coercive effect the very opposite of that separation of church and State 
contemplated by the First Amendment.  
 
 The Court explicitly found that “the application of the provisions of Title VII to the 
employment relationship existing between The Salvation Army and Mrs. McClure, a church and 
its minister would result in an encroachment by the State into an area of religious freedom which 
                                                 
28  The Court in McClure cited a series of cases in which the Supreme Court had 
delineated a posture of deference toward decisions made by ecclesiastical polities on ownership 
of property and control over personnel with religious duties.  460 F.2d at 559-60. 
29  Id. at 558. 
30   Id. at 559. 
31  Id. at 560. 
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it is forbidden to enter by the principles of the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.”32 
Nevertheless, resting on the principle that statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional 
questions, the Court concluded “that Congress did not intend, through the nonspecific wording of 
the applicable provisions of Title VII, to regulate the employment relationship between church 
and minister,”33 and affirmed the dismissal of the case.  
The decision in McClure purported to rest on an act of statutory interpretation, designed 
to avoid the constitutional question that would have been raised by a construction of the statute 
that made it applicable to sex discrimination in the employment relationship with clergy.  
Thirteen years later, in Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh Day Adventists,34 a panel 
opinion by Judge Wilkinson of the 4th Circuit fully constitutionalized the “ministerial exception.”  
The Rayburn opinion is by far the most carefully and elaborately reasoned of all the 
many Circuit Court decisions about the ministerial exception, and the most widely cited.  Carole 
Rayburn had applied for a position as an Associate in Pastoral Care in the Seventh Day Adventist 
Church.  That position did not require ordination, and was open only to women.  When the 
Church’s Potomac Conference denied Rayburn the position, she brought suit under Title VII, 
alleging that the Conference had engaged in sex discrimination as well as race-based 
discrimination against her because of her association with black people and her membership in 
“black-oriented religious organizations.”35   
                                                 
32 Id. at 560. 
33  Id. at 560-61. 
34 772 F. 2d 1164 (4th Circuit 1985). 
35  Id. at 1165. 
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Judge Wilkinson’s panel opinion affirmed a grant of summary judgment for the 
Conference.  The opinion first explained in detail why the exemption in section 702, for religious 
hiring by religious organizations did not apply to this case, in which the allegations involved sex 
and race discrimination.36 
Judge Wilkinson then turned directly to the constitutional questions raised by the 
collision between the First Amendment and the application of Title VII to employment decisions 
relating to the clergy.    Like the McClure panel, the Rayburn panel rested its constitutional 
concern on three, related strands of Religion Clause doctrine – respect for the affairs of religious 
entities “on matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or 
law;"37 the then-controlling Free Exercise Clause requirement that burdens on religious freedom 
be balanced against relevant state interests;38 and the Establishment Clause-based concern for 
“excessive government entanglement” with religious institutions.39  
In light of the duties of the Associate’s position, which included “teaching baptismal and 
Bible classes, pastoring the singles group, occasional preaching at [various] churches, and other 
evangelical, liturgical, and counseling responsibilities,”40 Judge Wilkinson concluded that 
application of Title VII to the Conference would constitute a violation of the First Amendment.  
The Associate’s duties were highly “significant in the expression and realization of Seventh Day 
                                                 
36 Id. at 1166-67. 
37  Id. at 1167, quoting Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976). 
38  Id. at 1168-69. 
39  Id. at 1169-72. 
40  Id. at 1165. 
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Adventist beliefs.”41  Accordingly, regulation of the choice of an Associate intruded on matters 
of church teaching, and entangled the state in a decision at the heart of ecclesiastical concern.  
On the question of interest-balancing under the Free Exercise Clause, the panel concluded that 
while “an unfettered church choice may create minimal infidelity to the objectives of Title VII, it 
provides maximum protection of the First Amendment right to the free exercise of religious 
beliefs. The balance of values thus weighs against Rayburn's suggestion that the government 
may question the decision of the Seventh-day Adventist Church to hire another candidate as an 
associate in pastoral care.”42 
In the quarter-century since Rayburn, the “ministerial exception” has caught on 
throughout the American legal world.  Almost every circuit has adopted it,43 as have a number 
of states.  Although a number of courts have refused to extend the “ministerial exception” to 
cases of sexual harassment,44  and questions of which positions fall under the exception 
frequently arise,45 no court has ever rejected or repudiated the basic doctrine of the “ministerial 
                                                 
41  Id. at 1168. 
42   Id. at 1169. 
43  See cases cited note 18 supra (missing only the 10th Cir). 
44  See, e.g., Bollard v. California Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 
Cal. 1999); Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. Wash. 2004); Black v. 
Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991);  McKelvey v. Pierce, 173 N.J. 26 (N.J. 2002).  
45  See, e.g., Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. Ill. 
2003) (Hispanic communications director is minister for some job functions); EEOC v. Roman 
Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. N.C. 2000) (music director fits within exemption); 
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exception.”  The exception has spread beyond civil rights laws to statutes regulating wages and 
hours46 as well as to common law causes of action that may arise out of the employment relation 
between clergy and religious entities.  Although some judges still prefer to describe the 
exception as a rule of statutory interpretation,47 many continue to cite Rayburn and invoke a 
constitutional basis for the exception. 
 Despite this widespread adoption of the exception, and its expansion into positions 
beyond that of ordained clergy,48 unanswered questions remain about its constitutional 
provenance.  Recall that virtually every case raising claims of sex, race, age, or disability 
discrimination involves assertions of covert discrimination, rather than the explicit and overt 
                                                                                                                                                             
Miller v. Bay View United Methodist Church, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (E.D. Wis. 2001) 
(music director); Elbaz v. Congregation Beth Judea, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Ill. 1992) 
(education director at religious school is not a “minister”); Patsakis v. Greek Orthodox 
Archdiocese of Am., 339 F. Supp. 2d 689 (W.D. Pa. 2004) (record keeper is not a minister); 
Powell v. Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343 (D. Colo. 1994) (theology teacher at Catholic high school 
qualifies as minister); Archdiocese v. Moersen, 399 Md. 637 (Md. 2007) (church organist not a 
minister). 
46  Schleicher v. The Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2008); Dole v. Shenandoah 
Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990); Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., 
Inc., 363 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 2004).  
47 Schleicher v. The Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., 
describing the ministerial exception as a “rule of interpretation.”)  
48  See cases cited note xx, supra. 
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variety practiced by various orthodox faiths with respect to the role of women in the clergy.  In 
cases of overt discrimination, a defendant would no doubt assert both longstanding tradition and 
theological justification for the refusal to ordain females. 
 In contrast, in cases involving claims of covert discrimination, the plaintiff typically 
claims that her race, sex, age, or disability is the true explanation for the adverse job treatment.  
The defendant – which holds itself out as an equal opportunity employer for the relevant position 
--typically denies that, and asserts that permissible reasons (which may or may not be disclosed) 
justify the adverse treatment.  The plaintiff then typically asserts that such reasons are a pretext 
for forbidden discrimination.  The function of the “ministerial exception,” which kicks in once 
the court has made a determination that the exception covers the position in question, is to cut off 
the possibility of adjudication of such pretext claims – that is, to block the judicial appraisal of 
whether the defendant had sufficient, nondiscriminatory reasons to justify the challenged job 
action.49 
 Describing the operation of the “ministerial exception” highlights its curious character.  
In the absence of any asserted religious reason for the challenged job action, why should 
religious entities be free from a judicial inquiry into whether their asserted non-religious reasons 
are pretextual?  Secular nonprofit organizations and for-profit businesses are  subject to such an 
inquiry, and it remains to be explained why religious organizations alone are immune from this 
sort of appraisal of their reasons for action.50   
                                                 
49 The mechanics of Title VII adjudication, including various kinds of pretext claims and 
relevant defenses, are described in detail in Corbin, note xx supra, at 2010-2022.  
50  Id. at 2010-2028 (critiquing the treatment of pretext claims in ministerial exception 
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 II. Justifying the Ministerial Exception -- Two False Starts 
 As described in the Introduction, and highlighted in cases like McClure and Rayburn, the 
standard account of the ministerial exception includes references to interest-balancing under the 
Free Exercise Clause, and a concern for “excessive governmental entanglement” in the internal 
affairs of religious entities.  In this part, we explain the problems associated with both of those 
standard accounts.   
A.  Conventional Free Exercise Norms 
1.  Pre-Employment Division v. Smith.  At the time that the ministerial exception 
flowered, the law included a seemingly robust regime of free exercise exemptions.  Both 
McClure (1972) and Rayburn (1985) were decided in the period between Sherbert v. Verner,51 
which midwifed that regime, and Employment Division v. Smith,52 which announced its demise.    
As subtly revealed and more subtly hidden in Judge Wilkinson’s opinion in Rayburn, the 
doctrine of free exercise exemptions was actually a threat to the “ministerial exception,” because 
the relevant standards required interest-balancing at the margin of the respective interests.  That 
is, unlike an Establishment Clause-anchored doctrine of ministerial exemption, which would 
admit of no interest-balancing whatsoever, a free exercise exemption could be overcome by 
application of a law that is narrowly tailored to very important state interests.53   
                                                                                                                                                             
cases).  Corbin’s critique is the most extended and effective in the literature to date.  
51  374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
52  494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
53 The most straightforward statement of the standard is probably in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U.S. 205, 2xx (1972). 
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In the case of application of Title VII anti-discrimination norms to allegations of covert 
(as distinguished from overt) sex discrimination in the employment of clergy, it is not at all 
obvious that religious institutions should prevail.54  The impact on the employment process 
might in many cases be quite trivial; if the inquiry into pretext quickly and easily flushed out 
forbidden discrimination rather than performance-related reasons for the adverse job action, the 
consequence would be reinstatement of an otherwise qualified member of the clergy, and 
deterrence of future like episodes.55  For those religious denominations that hold themselves out 
as willing to hire on an equal opportunity basis, forcing them to fully internalize their own, self-
proclaimed anti-discrimination norms would reinforce their pre-commitments about hiring in a 
spirit of equality.   
Moreover, clergy frequently are role models for youth and others, and leaders within their 
communities.  Hence, on the state’s side of the equation, the interest in maintaining equal 
opportunity in a profession as prestigious as the clergy seems especially strong.  Thus, a full and 
honest application of pre-Smith standards in this context does not lead to inevitable victory for 
religious institutions.  
2.  Post-Employment Division v. Smith.  Whether or not the courts acted correctly in their 
                                                 
54  In the case of those faiths that openly exclude females from roles in the clergy, the 
balancing at the margin might well come out differently, because the impact of the tradition and 
experience of the faith would be much greater in cases where a legal ruling for the plaintiff 
would effectively cause gender integration of the clergy where none had existed before. 
55 For development of this argument in a variety of contexts, see Corbin, note xx supra, at 
2010-2022.  
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application of the doctrine of free exercise exemptions to ministerial exception cases, the 1990 
decision in Employment Division v. Smith56 ripped the pegs out from under any general theory 
of free exercise exemptions.  The emphasis in Smith was administrability – that is, whether 
courts could apply in a principled way the doctrine of exemptions, in which they had to weigh 
the burden on the claimant’s religious freedom against the costs to the state of maintaining an 
exemption from an otherwise general rule.57 
The problems presented by the pre-Smith exemption doctrine were even greater for 
religious institutions than religious individuals. First and foremost, literally everything that such 
institutions do constitutes an “exercise of religion.”58  Accordingly, any state regulation that 
adds expense or inconvenience to these tasks would burden religion in a way that might be 
cognizable under the Free Exercise Clause.   Some of these burdens barely touch religious 
experience, if they touch it at all – for example, requiring certain methods of trash disposal in 
circumstances in which the denomination has no religious scruples about such matters.59  Other 
                                                 
56  494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
57 Id. at 8xx. 
58 Douglas Laycock, Toward A General Theory of the Establishment Clause: The Case of 
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1373, 1398 
(1981) (arguing that the right of church autonomy extends to every aspect of church operations).  
Professor Laycock has since retreated from this broad view.  See [contribution to this 
Symposium]  For contemporary defenses of a broad “freedom of the church,” see Kalscheur, 
note 4, supra; Garnett, note 4 supra. 
59 That sort of regulation does not directly burden religious practice or belief, but it may 
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burdens on religious experience, such as that which might have been required if Title VII norms 
applied to overt sex discrimination in clergy selection by orthodox faiths, would have been quite 
significant.  Were courts to be forced to apply pre-Smith free exercise norms to the enormously 
wide variety of institutional decisions and policies, the problems of even-handed administration 
would have been even greater than they had proven to be in the case of individuals.  Moreover, 
when judicial administration of free exercise norms strays from even-handedness, the risk of 
favoritism for mainstream or otherwise socially acceptable faiths is considerable.  
The Court in Smith, surveying the wide landscape of exemption claims denied in the time 
since Sherbert v. Verner,60 concluded that principled adjudication in cases where religious 
scruples had to be balanced against state concerns was indeed unlikely, and therefore jettisoned 
the doctrine of exemptions in all but a few special circumstances.61 The decision in Smith did 
                                                                                                                                                             
add to the cost of running the institution, and thereby take away resources that otherwise could 
be devoted to religious practice. 
60 For a survey of this landscape, and the general failure of free exercise claims in the 
Supreme Court between 1963 and 1990, see Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A Lawyer's 
Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 171, 178-185 (1995). 
61  The Court in Smith suggested that religion-friendly free exercise decisions like 
Wisconsin v. Yoder and Cantwell v. Connecticut could be explained through a theory of “hybrid 
rights;” that is, as cases in which free exercise interest combined favorably with other 
constitutional claims.  In EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of America, 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 
1996), a panel of the D.C. Circuit argued that “ministerial exception” cases survived Smith 
because they involved hybrid rights derived from the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise 
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not lead, however, to the demise of the ministerial exception.  Instead, courts fell back on the line 
of decisions, pre-dating and post-dating Sherbert and Yoder, concerning non-intervention in the 
internal affairs of religious entities.62  On the surface, that account does not require interest-
balancing, and so may not be vulnerable to the same criticism that can be leveled against 
application of the doctrine of free exercise exemptions.  But a defense of the “ministerial 
exception” based on a concept of deference to a religious entity’s handling of its own internal 
affairs raises its own, still larger questions about the concept of church autonomy.  
B. “Excessive entanglement” in the internal affairs of religious institutions. 
 Dating back to soon after the Civil War, and well before the Supreme Court held the 
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment applicable to the state, the Court began to apply a 
common law rule of deference to the decisions of religious bodies.  Starting with Watson v. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Clause.  To our knowledge, no other court has picked up on this theory, probably because a) the 
theory of “hybrid rights’ is deeply problematic, and has never caught on in the lower courts, and 
b) the “ministerial exception” has not collapsed in the wake of Smith, and thus did not need 
rehabilitation by way of the theory of “hybrid rights.” 
62  See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of America, 83 F.3d 455, 62-63 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (arguing 
that the Supreme Court in Smith was focused on free exercise claims of individuals, not 
institutions, and did not intend to cast any doubt its prior decisions about non-intervention in 
matters of church property and personnel).  See also Kathleen Brady, note xx supra, at 1636 
(“read carefully, Smith supports a broad right of church autonomy that extends to all aspects of 
church affairs, the most religiously sensitive as well as the more mundane.”) 
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Jones63 in 1871, and continuing through Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milojevich64 in 
1976, the Court has consistently deferred to authoritative religious bodies and tribunals in cases 
involving disputes over the ownership of real property and control over religious personnel. 
 This line of decisions does not, however, stand for any general proposition of the 
autonomy of churches over their “internal affairs.”  The decisions that concern ownership and 
control of real property typically involve intra-denominational factions, competing in the civil 
courts over title to the land and buildings of the church.65  The decisions that concern personnel 
involve attempts by disappointed applicants or holders of clergy positions to use the civil courts 
to correct a church decision that has gone against them.66 
These decisions are complex, and we cannot rehearse here all of the details of this 
                                                 
63 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). 
64 426 U.S. 696 (1976). 
65 See, e.g., Watson v. Jones,80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871); Presbyterian Church v. Mary 
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kedroff v. St. 
Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).  For 
a good account of the property disputes, see Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court 
Involvement in Conflicts Over Religious Property, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1843  (1998).  
66 Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929); Serbian E. Orthodox 
Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).  See also NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 
440 U.S. 490 (1979) (reading National Labor Relations Act narrowly so as to avoid 
constitutional concern about government entanglement in the personnel policies of religious 
schools). 
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complex body of law.  The essential characteristic of this entire line of decision, however, is its 
repeated insistence that civil courts are disabled from answering ecclesiastical questions, whether 
they are questions of fidelity to religious teaching, appropriate criteria for appointment to 
ecclesiastical office, or proper ecclesiastical decision procedures.  When the answers to such 
questions are essential to the resolution of a dispute, the teaching of these cases is that courts 
must find the locus of decisional authority within the church and defer to the exercise of that 
authority.67 
When Smith is read in conjunction with these decisions about deference on ecclesiastical 
matters, it seems staggeringly overbroad to characterize these latter cases as insulating from the 
exercise of state power the “internal affairs” of churches.  Wholly “internal” affairs of churches – 
e.g., the color of the robes worn by clergy -- or any other organization are never the state’s 
concern.  It is only and always the existence or likelihood of negative externalities that provokes 
legal interest in any organizational conduct or transaction.  If churches breach their contracts, 
even with members of their own faith, the delivery of goods or the provision of labor may go 
uncompensated, with corresponding economic loss.  If religious entities, acting through their 
agents, behave tortiously, someone is the victim.68  If religious employers violate labor laws, 
                                                 
67 Brady, note  xx supra, and Laycock, note xx supra, both take a much broader view of 
these decisions, finding in them (along with others) an expansive right of church autonomy. 
68 We discuss the complex connection between the decisions about ecclesiastical matters 
and application of principles of tort law to religious entities in Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, 
Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, 2004 Brigham Young University Law Review 
1789 (arguing for a qualified first amendment privilege for religious entities in cases involving 
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and policies designed to protect employment security, safety, or opportunity are thereby 
breached, the well-being of employees is undermined. 
Any attempt to reason from the Supreme Court’s decisions on church property or 
personnel to a more general theory of the autonomy of religious entities cannot be sustained.  As 
Doug Laycock said in this Symposium -- remarking on his own influential article on church 
autonomy, published in 198169 – the general theory simply covers far too much to be credible, 
and thus collapses into an inevitably inconsistent balancing of state interests against the interests 
of religious entities.70  While there are good reasons, explored below, to keep the state’s 
adjudicatory machinery away from many questions related to the employment of clergy, the case 
for across-the-board judicial abstention in matters that affect personnel, such as workplace safety 
or retirement security, is considerably weaker.  Many of the questions that arise from the 
employment relations of religious entities may be quite identical to analogous matters that appear 
in the behavior of any non-profit entity.  An interest-balancing approach to church autonomy 
thus always reduces to an inquiry questions of the degree of intrusion into church affairs, and the 
marginal efficacy of such intrusion in advancing state policy.  The questions of measurement and 
even-handedness raised under such an approach are virtually identical to those raised by the 
methodology once employed – but now abandoned -- in free exercise exemption cases.  
                                                                                                                                                             
claims of negligent supervision of clergy). 
69 Douglas Laycock, Toward A General Theory of the Establishment Clause: The Case of 
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1373 (1981). 
70  Douglas Laycock [article for this Symposium, or transcript if he is not publishing his 
remarks]. 
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Moreover, the standard Establishment Clause account of the Court’s decisions about the 
property and personnel of religious entities as involving “excessive government entanglement” 
with religious entities is insufficiently explanatory of the norms underlying those decisions.  An 
approach centered on “entanglement” suffers from many of the same defects as a general theory 
of church autonomy.  Application of the doctrine requires attention to exactly which affairs of a 
religious entity are implicated in state regulation.  Why should it be even a little troublesome, for 
example, for the state to be heavily involved in the regulation of safety and security of children at 
a church-run day care center?   
Moreover, the question of what degree of state interaction is “excessive” inevitably 
involves questions of degree that can only be resolved in light of respective governmental and 
private interests.  An inquiry into whether the reasons for an adverse job action against a 
clergyman are pretextual are highly likely to entangle the church and the state – after all, the 
church is the defendant, the adjudicator is an arm of the state, and the substantive question is 
whether legally impermissible factors influenced the adverse job action.71  But the question 
remains -- by what combination of qualitative and quantitative measures is it to be determined 
that such interaction is constitutionally excessive?      
 In our view, the theory of free exercise exemptions for religious entities, and the 
still broader, companion theory requiring autonomy for the “internal affairs” of such entities, 
suffer from similar flaws.  They both appear to sweep far too broadly, presumptively insulating 
from regulation those matters in which religious organizations are quite indistinct from their 
                                                 
71 Corbin, note xx supra, argues that courts can decide many such cases without crossing 
into constitutionally dangerous territory.  Id. at 2010-2022.  
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secular counterparts.  Whether or not legislatures are free to permissively accommodate religious 
organizations by relaxing the state’s regulatory grip, judicial mandates that government 
deregulate religious entities seem quite excessive as a matter of constitutional principle.  Such 
mandates would privilege religious over secular institutions in ways that cannot be justified by 
norms of religious freedom, and that may well violate norms of associational equality.  The 
“ministerial exception” and other restrictions, discussed below, on the judicial resolution of 
disputes between religious entities and their leaders can be persuasively defended only from 
narrower ground. 
 
 III. Adjudicative Disability as a Theory of Ministerial Exception 
 Despite its widespread acceptance in the lower courts, the ministerial exception is a 
doctrine in search of a new and more precise theory of justification.  Such a theory is especially 
important as the exception gets pressed in new and different circumstances, and limitations on it 
appear.72 
A. Adjudicative Disability and the Theory of “Neutral Principles” 
 The seeds from which such a theory might germinate are to be found most recently and 
                                                 
72  The cases involving claims of sexual harassment of clergy have generated the most 
significant limitations to date on the ministerial exception.  See, e.g., Bollard v. California 
Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. Cal. 1999); Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian 
Church, 375 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. Wash. 2004); Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1991);  McKelvey v. Pierce, 173 N.J. 26 (N.J. 2002). 
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straightforwardly in the Supreme Court’s 1979 decision in Jones v. Wolf.73  The case involved a 
conflict between factions of a Presbyterian church in Macon, Georgia, over whether or not to 
remain affiliated with the Presbyterian Church of the United States (PCUS).74  A majority of the 
congregation voted to sever ties with PCUS, and the question litigated in the case was whether 
the minority that wished to remain in PCUS had a right to exclusive possession and use of the 
property of the local church.75  Rather than deferring to the decision of the hierarchical body 
within PCUS, which had backed the minority faction in the dispute over the property, the 
Georgia state courts had applied various principles of state law and had ruled in favor of the 
majority faction.76 
 A narrowly divided U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Georgia state courts were 
constitutionally free to apply the relevant state law on the relevant subjects of trusts, real 
property, and construction of the charter of nonprofit organizations, and were not obliged to 
defer to the decision of the body with ecclesiastical authority within the church.  The key 
precondition to the exercise of this jurisprudential freedom, which state courts were not bound to 
exercise, was that the relevant principles of state law were “neutral.”  By “neutral, “the Court 
explained, it meant principles that kept the courts away from the decision of questions of 
religious doctrine, organization, or practice.77 
                                                 
73 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
74  Id. at 597-99. 
75  Id. at 602. 
76  Id. at  599-601. 
77  Id. at 602-606.  Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion for a majority that included 
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 Given our reliance on the decision’s constitutional approach, it is worth quoting at length 
the crucial passage from the opinion in Jones v. Wolf:78 
 It is . . . clear . . . that "the First Amendment severely circumscribes the 
role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes." . . .Most 
importantly, the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving church 
property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice. . . . As a 
corollary to this commandment, the Amendment requires that civil courts defer to 
the resolution of issues of religious doctrine or polity by the highest court of a 
hierarchical church organization. . .  Subject to these limitations, however,  the 
First Amendment does not dictate that a State must follow a particular method of 
resolving church property disputes. Indeed, "a State may adopt any one of various 
approaches for settling church property disputes so long as it involves no 
consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the 
tenets of faith. 
 At least in general outline, we think the "neutral principles of law" 
approach is consistent with the [relevant] . . . constitutional principles. . . .The 
primary advantages of the neutral-principles approach are that it is completely 
secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to accommodate all forms of 
religious organization and polity. The method relies exclusively on objective, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Rehnquist, and Stevens.  Justice Powell, joined by Justices Stewart, 
White, and Chief Justice Burger, dissented. 
78  Id. at 602-03 (citations omitted). 
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well-established concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges. 
It thereby promises to free civil courts completely from entanglement in questions 
of religious doctrine, polity, and practice.  
 This defense of what the Jones opinion calls “neutral principles” is a straightforward 
statement of the adjudicative disability imposed by the Establishment Clause on the civil courts 
(and, by necessary implication, legislatures and administrative agencies).  This disability, and the 
correlative immunity from processes of adjudication, attaches to questions put for decision, not 
to the character of the dispute (e.g., land use) or the parties to the dispute (e.g., clergy, religious 
entities, or squabbling factions thereof).   
 The disabling effect of the necessity to decide certain questions is jurisdictional in the 
strong sense – that is, it cannot be waived, or conferred by consent of the parties.  For example, 
in EEOC v. Catholic University of America,79 the DC Circuit affirmed a decision by a trial court 
judge to dismiss a civil rights claim by a faculty member, Sister Elizabeth McDonough, who 
alleged that she had been the victim of sex discrimination in the University’s denial of her tenure 
in the Department of Canon Law.  A central question in the dispute concerned the quality of 
Sister McDonough’s scholarship in canon law.  The parties had been willing to litigate the merits 
of the case, but the district court found that “it is neither reasonably possible nor legally 
permissible for a lay trier of fact to evaluate these competing opinions on religious subjects.”80  
The appeals court agreed that the ministerial exception covered the case, because the plaintiff 
was engaged in training priests with instruction devoted to religious subjects.   
                                                 
79  83 F. 3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996 
80  Id. at 465. 
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 Contrary to what courts typically say about such cases, however, the crucial 
constitutional concern in the case was not the title of nor the general functions assigned to the 
position; rather, the court was disabled from adjudication by the presence of questions that 
focused on the quality of writing on subjects of ecclesiastical significance.   Had Sister 
McDonough been denied tenure for the asserted reason that she had assaulted a colleague, and 
the facts of the relevant incident were in dispute, a court would have been free to review the 
tenure denial.81 
 The doctrine of Jones v. Wolf is not always easy to apply, as the disposition of Jones v. 
Wolf itself revealed.82  Cases about ownership and control of real property have been among the 
most difficult in which to apply the concept of “neutral principles,” because questions of 
religious organization and practice may frequently be interwoven with seemingly neutral 
principles of property or trust law.   The private ordering associated with those bodies of law 
facilitates the exercise control of property by religious organizations, but also invites the 
                                                 
81 In such circumstances, the relevant claim might be for breach of employment contract, 
not sex discrimination.  Moreover, the question of the appropriateness of specific performance – 
in this case, reinstatement as a professor of canon law in a university under Vatican control 
because its mission included training Catholic priests – as a remedy raises its own separate, 
constitutional concerns.  See the discussion, infra, of sexual harassment cases and the 
reinstatement remedy in disputes involving religious employers and their leaders.  
82  The majority in Jones vacated and remanded the decision of the Georgia Supreme 
Court in favor of the local majority, because the state courts had not been clear on the precise 
content of the relevant “neutral principle” of state law.  443 U.S. at 606-610. 
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possibility of latent ambiguity with respect to the religious reference points reflected in that 
private ordering.  
 In the years since Jones v. Wolf, however, the lower courts have been quite busily 
applying its doctrine in other contexts, including the law of torts.  For example, in cases 
involving the liability of religious entities for negligent supervision of clergy, courts have quite 
commonly invoked the idea of neutral principles of tort law to justify adjudicating tort 
liability.83  And, closer to the precise subject of this article, the search for relevant and 
controlling “neutral principles” has also animated the effort to mark the boundary between 
employment disputes that courts may adjudicate and those that are beyond their jurisdiction.  As 
explained below, the cases involving sexual harassment claims by clergy are at the cutting edge 
of this boundary quest. 
 The jurisdictional focus of Jones v. Wolf, and the limited adjudicative disability it 
reaffirms, resonates with broader themes in Establishment Clause theory.  As we have argued 
elsewhere,84 the Clause represents a key element in the idea of limited government.  Like the 
realm of sexuality and reproduction - worldly matters that are constitutionally off-limits -- the 
                                                 
83 Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, 2004 
Brigham Young University Law Review 1789, 1851 & n. 243 (citing a number of decisions from 
various jurisdictions holding “that the tort of negligent employment rests upon a ‘neutral 
principle[] of law,” applicable to religious institutions even if the dispute involves questions of 
religious documents or practices.”)  
84 Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our 
Constitutional Order, 47 Vill. L. Rev. 37 (2002). 
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realm of the spirit is reserved for private decision.85  Marking out regulatory zones from which 
government is excluded constitutes a central element in a strategy of ensuring the anti-totalitarian 
quality of governance.86 
Working out the details of the restriction on government speaking in a spiritual voice is 
of course quite difficult, as illustrated by decisions on government-sponsored display of the Ten 
Commandments87 and the symbols of religious holidays.88  The courts have at times permitted 
such displays, when the government has been able to make the case that it is not endorsing a 
theological position nor speaking in ways that reasonable observers will so perceive.  A long and 
unbroken history of government acknowledgment – though not veneration or worship -- of a 
generic, nondenominational God has its claims.89  But the underlying principle against 
                                                 
85  Id. at 83-84. 
86 Id.. 
87  Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 
545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
88 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 
(1989). 
89  We develop our own normative approach to the question of when government may 
acknowledge the religious beliefs reflected in national history or popular culture in Ira C. Lupu 
& Robert W. Tuttle, The Cross at College: Accommodation and Acknowledgment of Religion at 
Public Universities, 16 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 939, 980-993 (2008) (defending the 
constitutionality of historical and cultural, but not reverential, acknowledgment, and noting the 
difficulties that may arise in distinguishing among the three types).  
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government bodies, including courts, adopting a view on spiritual questions remains important 
and intact, especially in contexts where what is at stake is denominational or sectarian 
disagreements. 
 Whether the adjudicative disability imposed by the Establishment Clause extends to 
claims of pretext in the context of anti-discrimination suits involving clergy, or to any other 
particular context of dispute between religious institutions and their leaders, remains to be teased 
out.  The teasing must be done, however, against the backdrop of a broader principle that the 
Clause should operate to exclude government from a certain class of messages and decisions.  In 
what follows, we apply this principle, and the adjudicative disability that we think follows from 
it, to a variety of contexts, including that of discrimination claims in employment relations with 
clergy.  
B.  The Theory of Adjudicative Disability Applied 
 To explore the contours of this theory of adjudicative disability, we will first describe and 
analyze a set of hypothetical claims that courts should find non-justiciable under the theory.  We 
will then suggest a set of claims that, under the same theory, should be justiciable.  Finally, we 
will explore a set of hard cases that test and illuminate the boundaries between the first two types 
of claims.  
1. Non-justiciable claims 
 The first set of examples involves causes of action that courts should not adjudicate.  As 
we argue, resolution of each of these claims would require courts to answer questions that the 
state is not competent to address. 
 Example A: Overt discrimination.  A congregation advertises an opening for the 
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position of youth pastor, and Anne applies.  She meets the educational requirements and 
work experience listed in the advertisement, but the congregation rejects her application.  
In a letter, the congregation explains that “under our governing documents, women are 
not eligible to serve in pastoral positions.”  Anne files a lawsuit alleging gender 
discrimination in employment, and the congregation moves to dismiss, invoking the 
ministerial exception.90 
 Very few lawsuits raise the issue of overt, doctrinally-based employment 
discrimination,91 although the issue stands at the core of the ministerial exception.  If the 
exception validly covers any claims, it should protect religious traditions such as Roman 
Catholicism or Orthodox Judaism that exclude women from ordained ministry. 
 The strongest constitutional defense of overt discrimination in the employment of clergy, 
however, may not come from the Religion Clauses.  Instead, such openly exclusionary policies 
may rest most strongly on a generic principle of associational freedom.  In Boy Scouts of 
America v. Dale,92 the Supreme Court held that the Boy Scouts were free to exclude gays from 
                                                 
90 In our examples, we ignore procedural requirements that impose preconditions, such as 
exhaustion of administrative remedies, for filing discrimination claims or similar actions.  See, 
e.g., U.S. Equal Opportunity Commission, “Filing a Charge of Employment Discrimination,” 
available at: http://www.eeoc.gov/charge/overview_charge_filing.html. 
91 But see Klouda v. Southwestern Baptist Theol. Seminary, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
22157 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2008) (seminary professor discharged after school decided to 
conform its hiring of faculty to the denomination’s prohibition on women serving as ministers). 
92 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
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leadership positions, notwithstanding a state statute that prohibited discrimination based on 
sexual orientation.  The case arose when the Boy Scouts revoked the membership of James Dale, 
an adult leader in the group, because of Dale’s open avowal of his homosexuality.93  Dale sued 
under state law prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation, but the Supreme Court 
held that the application of the anti-discrimination law to Dale’s membership violated the Boy 
Scouts’ First Amendment right to communicate its message through its choice of leaders.94 
 A religious group’s policy of not ordaining women is indistinguishable from the Boy 
Scouts’ policy of excluding those who are openly gay from leadership positions.  Both policies 
reflect explicit choices about the group’s identity and message.  Compliance with anti-
discrimination norms would require the group to promote a message – the fitness of certain 
classes for leadership – to which the group is opposed. 
 Although religion-neutral protection for expressive association offers a strong defense for 
the practice of overt discrimination in the employment of clergy, defenders of the practice can 
also appeal to a principle embedded deep in the history of constitutional protections for religious 
liberty.  Many in the founding generation, including James Madison, expressed grave concern 
about government licensing of clergy.95  Under licensing schemes, clergy were required to obtain 
                                                 
93 Id. at 644-45. 
94 Id. at 653-61. 
95 James H. Hutson, Church and State in America: The First Two Centuries 87-93 
(Cambridge, 2008); John T. Noonan, The Lustre of Our Country: The American Experience of 
Religious Freedom 67 (1998) (discussing James Madison's opposition to the Crown's licensing 
of ministers in Virginia); Steven Waldman, Founding Faith: Providence, Politics, and the Birth 
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official permission before preaching, proselytizing, or leading worship.  To Madison and others, 
these licensing schemes restrained free speech, discriminated against disfavored religious groups, 
and reflected a belief that civil government was competent – in substance and authority – to rule 
on religious matters.96 
 Of course, employment discrimination rules can be distinguished from clergy licensing.  
Most importantly, anti-discrimination norms apply equally to all employers, but licensing 
schemes were targeted only at religious groups, and were typically driven by the hostility of 
established faiths to newer religious movements.97  In other respects, however, the imposition of 
employment discrimination norms on clergy employment closely resembles the practice of 
clergy licensing.  Most importantly, employment discrimination rules establish official criteria of 
eligibility for employment as clergy, and do so in a way that differs little from standards of 
educational achievement or technical competence.  A ban on discrimination in the selection of 
clergy, just like a rule that clergy must have an advanced academic degree or complete a course 
                                                                                                                                                             
of Religious Freedom on America 100-06 (Random House, 2008); Michael W. McConnell, 
Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 Wm. 
and Mary L. Rev. 2105, 2119-20 (2003). 
96 Hutson, supra note XX, at 124-25. 
97 In this respect, schemes of clergy licensing may find a closer modern parallel in some 
jurisdictions’ land use restrictions, which can make it very difficult for new religious 
organizations find sites for houses of worship.  See, e.g., Islamic Center of Mississippi v. City of 
Starkville, 840 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1988); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Jefferson 
County, 741 F. Supp. 1522 (N.D. Ala. 1990). 
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in pastoral counseling, implies that government can decide who is fit to serve as a priest, rabbi or 
other religious leader.98  By requiring that all faiths must be open to hiring women for the role of 
clergy, the government official expresses the view that women are capable of performing that 
role – which encompasses, for some traditions, the power of representing the divine.99  Through 
such a determination, the government would be asserting its authority over highly contested 
theological and ecclesiastical questions, from the character of worship to the nature of the holy. 
 Exemption from government-mandated eligibility requirements, however, does not mean 
that religious institutions enjoy complete legal immunity for their hiring decisions.100  For 
                                                 
98 The military’s eligibility requirements for chaplains do not raise the same concerns as a 
scheme of clergy licensing.  See U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Instr. 1304.28, Guidance for the 
Appointment of Chaplains in the Military Departments (11 Jun. 2004).  The military 
commissions chaplains as officers, and expects them to perform a number of roles in addition to 
the direct provision of religious services.  The educational requirements for chaplains are based 
on that full range of duties, and thus reflect a legitimate governmental interest.  See generally, Ira 
C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle, Instruments of Accommodation: The Military Chaplaincy and the 
Establishment Constitution, 110 W.Va. L. Rev. 89 (2007). 
99 See John Paul II, Apostolic letter, Ordinatio Sacerdotalis: On Reserving Priestly 
Ordination To Men Alone (May 22, 1994), available at: 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_letters/documents/hf_jp-
ii_apl_22051994_ordinatio-sacerdotalis_en.html 
100 To take a somewhat different example, consider a religious community that 
recognizes a child as its leader.  A community should be free to select a minor as its religious 
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example, a child injured by a pastor’s abusive conduct may sue the congregation for negligent 
selection or retention of the pastor,101 even though that cause of action may have a chilling effect 
on employment decisions by religious bodies.102  The negligent selection tort does not directly 
regulate who is qualified to serve as clergy;103  instead, it ensures that employers take 
                                                                                                                                                             
leader, but the state may nonetheless impose restrictions on the conditions of that minor's 
employment.  Although such a leader may be limited in the number of hours each week she can 
work, the choice of leader still belongs to the religious community.  Prince v Massachusetts, 321 
U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding enforcement of state child labor laws against parents who used 
children to distribute religious literature; the parents had argued that the children were ministers 
of the faith, but the court ruled that child labor laws could be enforced without regard to the 
children’s religious status). 
101 Lupu and Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, supra note XX, at 
1847-49. 
102 Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 795-97 (9th Cir. 2005) (Kozinski, 
J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (criticizing analysis of ministerial exception as 
protection of religious hiring from potential chilling effects of civil litigation). 
103  In a sexual harassment case involving a minister, Judge Kozinski wrote: 
But letting Elvig recover damages for harassment does not regulate employment 
directly; at most, it may have a collateral effect on employment by changing the 
employer's incentives to retain or remove the accused employee. As such, 
damages suits by employees for sexual harassment are no more intrusive than 
parishioners' negligent supervision lawsuits based on molestation by priests. 
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responsibility for the foreseeable risks that their decisions impose on others.104  If a congregation 
wishes to employ a pastor who has previously been convicted of child abuse, the congregation is 
legally free to do so,105 although the result of a mistaken judgment about future conduct is likely 
to be devastating – for any injured child as well as the congregation.106 
 Thus, there is a constitutional distinction between official criteria for employment of 
clergy and tort liability for negligent selection.  Official criteria for clergy employment, even if 
imposed through the formally religion-neutral standards of anti-discrimination law, directly 
control a congregation’s expression of its message, as personified in the role of pastoral 
leadership.  Put differently, the plaintiff-cleric’s alleged injury is inseparable from the 
congregation’s choice of its leader.  Any remedy for the plaintiff’s injury would inevitably limit 
                                                                                                                                                             
Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 796 (9th Cir. 2005) (Kozinski, J., concurring 
in denial of rehearing en banc).   
104 We have suggested procedural modifications in this cause of action to protect 
legitimate interests of religious institutions.  Lupu and Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and 
Ecclesiastical Immunity, supra note XX, at 1860-67 (arguing that courts should adopt heightened 
standard of proof for claims of negligent employment).  
105 The pastor may be barred, by previous identification as a sex offender, from taking the 
position, but rules on child protection do not prohibit congregations from hiring sex offenders as 
clergy. 
106 See, e.g., Doe v. Liberatore, 478 F. Supp. 2d 742 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (discussing 
potential theories under which diocese could be held liable in connection with priest’s sexual 
abuse of minors). 
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the congregation’s choice.  In contrast, the negligent selection tort imposes only an indirect 
constraint on a congregation’s pastoral options.  If a congregation faces liability arising from its 
negligent selection of a minister, the underlying injury must involve something other than the 
congregation’s mere choice of that cleric.  Instead, the congregation’s choice must have put the 
minister in a position that enabled the minister to cause injury to a third party.107  The tort of 
negligent selection addresses the injury that results from the minister’s conduct, not the 
congregation’s selection of the cleric per se.  
 Example B: Covert discrimination.  A rabbi has been employed by a synagogue 
for three years.  During the first two years, the rabbi’s performance was rated as excellent 
on performance reviews, and he enjoyed a good relationship with lay leaders in the 
congregation.  But a year ago the rabbi was in an auto accident that injured his leg; 
although he returned to work after a month, his relationship with leaders has suffered, and 
he has received a highly negative performance review.  The leaders contend that the rabbi 
no longer performs as many hospital or home visits as he did before the accident.  The 
rabbi contends that this deterioration has been caused by the congregation’s 
unwillingness to accommodate his continuing physical disability.  After months of 
growing discord, the congregation discharges the rabbi; in response, he brings an action 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act.108 
 Example B represents the most common type of case in which the ministerial exception is 
                                                 
107 Lupu and Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, supra note XX, at 
1847-48 (discussing elements for tort of negligent employment). 
108 Leavy v. Congregation Beth Shalom, 490 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (N.D. Iowa 2007). 
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raised.  A congregation claims that it complies with non-discrimination norms, or at least fails to 
assert a doctrinal basis for opposition to the norms, but the congregation rejects official 
enforcement of the norms in an action brought by clergy.109  Unlike the overt discrimination 
claims addressed in Example A, however, covert discrimination claims do not directly raise the 
issue of religious justification for the allegedly wrongful conduct.  If the congregation had to 
defend on the merits, it would deny that its conduct was wrongful, and offer a legitimate basis 
for the discharge.  The plaintiff would then assert that the congregation’s offered justification 
was only a pretext for impermissible discrimination, and the court would have to decide whether 
the congregation’s justification was legitimate.110 
 In cases of covert discrimination, the ministerial exception cuts off inquiry before a court 
must analyze the legitimacy of a congregation’s motives in acting toward its cleric.  If the court 
determines that the plaintiff is a “ministerial employee,” the defendant is a religious entity, and 
the dispute focuses on the defendant’s employment relationship with the plaintiff, then the 
ministerial exception is likely to end the matter.  The cleric does not get the opportunity to have 
the court test the adequacy, or even the good faith basis, of the congregation’s explanations for 
its conduct in the employment relationship.111  Indeed, the congregation is not required to offer 
any reason for its conduct. 
 At first glance, this ban on judicial consideration of assertions of pretext suggests that the 
                                                 
109 See, e.g., Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 175 & n.1 (5th Cir. 1999). 
110 Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360, 363 (8th Cir. 
1991). 
111 Williams v. Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 436 Mass. 574, 578-80 (Mass. 2002)  
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limit on the court’s authority derives from the categorical immunity or autonomy of the 
defendant religious institution.  In other words, the relationship between congregation and clergy 
stands wholly outside the court’s jurisdiction, and solely within the religious entity’s sphere of 
autonomy.112  Litigation of these disputes ends once the court determines that the claim arises out 
of that relationship. 
 On close inspection, however, a better way of understanding covert discrimination 
claims, and the resulting barrier to adjudication of pretext claims, is by analogy to the settled law 
regarding “clergy malpractice” claims.  In a variety of cases, plaintiffs have tried to assert the 
liability of clergy or congregations for the tort of clergy malpractice, defined as the failure to 
exercise reasonable care in the performance of professional duties.113  Courts have uniformly 
rejected clergy malpractice claims because the claims depend on establishment of a standard of 
                                                 
112 See, e.g., Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299 (11th 
Cir. 2000). 
113 Nally v. Grace Community Church, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97, 763 P.2d 948 
(1988), cert. den. 490 US 1007 (1989).  See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 283-86 (Colo. 
1988) (permitting a breach of fiduciary duty claim in a suit over sexual misconduct of a pastoral 
counselor, but rejecting plaintiff's claim of malpractice in counseling).  See also Schmidt v. 
Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 326-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Roppolo v. Moore, 644 So. 2d 206, 208-10 
(La. Ct. App. 1994); Strock v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1239 (Ohio 1988).  See generally 
Mark A. Weitz, Clergy Malpractice in America: Nally v. Grace Community Church of the 
Valley (Univ. Press of Kansas, 2001);  Lupu and Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical 
Immunity, supra note XX, at 1816, 1822-23 (discussing claims of clergy malpractice). 
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care for the “reasonable cleric.”114  The difficulties with such a standard are obvious.  Religious 
traditions differ dramatically in their understandings of the authority and role of clergy, along 
with the preparation necessary for the position.  To decide on a standard for a “reasonable 
minister,” a court would need to adopt some vision of the clergy – perhaps from one or a 
combination of traditions – as the norm, and essentially require the clergy of all traditions to 
conform to that role.115  In the alternative, a court could particularize the duty of “reasonable 
cleric” for each tradition, but that simply shifts disputes to intra-denominational differences over 
the office of ministry.  The standard of “reasonable Orthodox rabbi,” for example, is just as 
fraught with theological controversy as the standard of “reasonable minister.” 
 Thus, courts are disabled from deciding a clergy malpractice claim because of the 
specific question that adjudication of the claim requires courts to answer, rather than because 
such a claim seeks to hold clergy or their employers liable for torts.  To establish a standard of 
care for clergy malpractice, the court would have to decide what constitutes normal performance 
of the ministerial role.  And that is precisely the question typically at issue in ministers’ claims of 
covert discrimination.  In order to demonstrate that he was fired for an impermissible reason, the 
plaintiff minister must assert that he suffered adverse employment action notwithstanding his 
effective – or at least adequate – performance of the pastoral role.116  The court then must assess 
                                                 
114 Nally, 763 P.2d at 960. 
115 Lupu and Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, supra note XX, at 
1823. 
116 EEOC v. Catholic University, 83 F.3d 455, 465-66 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Miller v. Bay 
View United Methodist Church, 141 F.Supp. 2d 1174, 1184 (E.D. Wisc. 2001). 
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the quality of the plaintiff’s job performance, and such a determination requires the court to 
adopt a standard of reasonable performance within that role.117 
 A plaintiff, such as the one in our example, may attempt to evade the analogy with clergy 
malpractice claims by pointing to a pattern of positive job evaluations by the congregation.118  
But past evaluations do not resolve the issue of plaintiff’s current performance.  The court would 
still need to decide whether the plaintiff’s work remained of adequate quality, and whether the 
previous evaluations considered all of the elements relevant to the congregation’s judgment 
about the cleric’s work. 
 The same reasoning applies to discrimination claims raised at the hiring stage.  The 
candidate’s past performance in the position might be irrelevant, but a disappointed candidate 
would still need to show that she was qualified for the position, and that the congregation’s 
purported justification for denying her the position was a pretext for discrimination.119  
Assessment of her qualification would involve the constitutionally problematic inquiry identified 
in Example A, and scrutiny of the congregation’s allegedly pretextual justification would involve 
the court in the same difficulties faced by a clergy malpractice claim.  Courts cannot decide 
whether a congregation has engaged in discriminatory conduct toward a ministerial employee 
without first determining a set of qualifications for holding the role, or a standard of performance 
within the role, and then measuring the employee’s conduct against these standards.  Such acts of 
                                                 
117 Catholic University, 83 F.2d at 465-66; Miller, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1184. 
118 [CITE NEEDED] 
119 Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 
1357-58 (D.C. Cir. 1990).  
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measurement are beyond the state’s adjudicative competence. 
 Example C: Breach of Contract.  A congregation hires a pastor under a three-year 
contract, which provides that the pastor will only be removed from office for immoral 
conduct or a departure from church doctrine.  After a series of disagreements between the 
pastor and lay leaders, the congregation votes to terminate the pastor’s call.  The pastor 
alleges that the termination breached his employment contract because the congregation 
did not prove that he committed immoral conduct or advanced unorthodox teachings.  
The congregation alleged “unchristian behavior” as its reason for ending the call, but 
offered no specific grounds for that allegation.  The pastor asks the court for 
reinstatement in the call or damages for the loss of his salary through the end of the 
contract term.120 
 Example C raises the question of whether a congregation’s voluntary agreement with a 
pastor changes the constitutional analysis outlined in discussing the first two examples.  In one of 
the leading decisions on the ministerial exception, Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of the 
United Methodist Church,121 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit said that “[a] church 
is always free to burden its activities voluntarily through contract, and such contracts are fully 
                                                 
120 Music v. United Methodist Church, 864 S.W.2d 286 (Ky. 1993); Singleton v. Christ 
the Servant Evangelical Lutheran Church, 541 N.W.2d 606 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996);  see also 
Hartwig v. Albertus Magnus College, 93 F. Supp. 2d 200 (D. Conn. 2000) (priest, serving as 
faculty member of religious college, claimed breach of contract because dismissal, on grounds of 
his sexual orientation, violated provision of implied contract with faculty members). 
121 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
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enforceable in civil court.”122  Although it dismissed the minister’s claims of employment 
discrimination, the court permitted the minister to proceed with a contract-based claim against 
his denomination, reasoning that:  
. . . the issue of breach of contract can be adduced by a fairly direct inquiry into 
whether appellant's superintendent promised him a more suitable congregation, 
whether appellant gave consideration in exchange for that promise, and whether 
such congregations became available but were not offered to Pastor Minker.123 
 The D.C. Circuit determined that Reverend Minker’s breach of contract claim could 
proceed because a voluntary agreement entered into by the religious body has a different 
character than the compulsory standards of anti-discrimination law.  Judicial enforcement of 
such an agreement imposes a standard that the religious organization has already accepted, and 
on which the plaintiff-minister has relied.  That reasoning seems perfectly consistent with 
deriving the ministerial exception from the right to free exercise.  If the exception is designed to 
protect the autonomy of religious organizations, then beneficiaries of that protection should have 
the power to waive its application.124  Under such a rights-based theory, a religious organization 
should be free to submit its relationships with clergy to the standards and jurisdiction of civil 
law. 
                                                 
122 Id. at 1360.  See also Petruska, 462 F.3d 294, 310 (quoting Minker); Rayburn, 772 
F.2d at 1171. 
123 Minker, 894 F.2d at 1360. 
124 Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1041-42 (7th Cir. 2006), XX US 
XX cert. denied (2006). 
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 An Establishment Clause-based theory of adjudicative disability points in a very different 
direction.  Consent of the affected religious organization does not eliminate the constitutional 
problems identified in our discussion of the first two examples.125  Whether the litigation 
involves a claim of discrimination or breach of contract, a court would be asked to resolve the 
same issue: is the plaintiff qualified to assume or remain in the role of cleric?  The primary 
defect in adjudication of that question is the assertion of judicial competence itself, not the 
impact that the assertion might have on the religious body.  There are undoubtedly risks that a 
court might reach an erroneous decision about a minister’s performance, or that the decision 
might reflect judicial bias against some religious traditions, but such risks are subordinate to the 
more basic problem.  Adjudication of a minister’s role and performance implies that the 
government has authority over that subject matter, yet such an assertion violates the core 
Establishment Clause principle that limits civil government’s jurisdiction over religious matters.  
Courts have long rejected the idea that they may resolve congregational property disputes by 
determining which side has been faithful to doctrine.126  The Establishment Clause requires the 
same judicial abstention when a court is faced with a dispute over a minister’s performance in 
office, whether that dispute arises from breach of contract or violation of statute. 
 Voluntary consent of the affected parties does not eliminate the Establishment Clause 
                                                 
125 Id. 
126  Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449-51 (1969) (holding unconstitutional Georgia courts' use 
of “departure-from-doctrine” as a standard for resolving church property disputes). 
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limits on government authority over religion.127  For example, even if all of the parents in a 
public school district agreed to permit official prayers in the schools, the practice would still 
violate the Establishment Clause because the promotion of religious piety is not a 
constitutionally permissible object of civil government.128  Similarly, a congregation’s waiver of 
the ministerial exception should not vest a court with jurisdiction to decide on the quality of a 
minister’s job performance.  As the district court judged recognized sua sponte in EEOC v. 
Catholic University,129 the Establishment Clause disables courts from deciding religious 
questions, and the parties may not vest the court with adjudicative authority by consent. 
 The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Minker may appear to contradict this conclusion, but it is 
actually consistent with our reasoning.  Although the court permitted Minker’s contract claim to 
go forward, it added a caution: 
                                                 
127 McDonnell v. Episcopal Diocese of Ga., 191 Ga. App. 174, 175, 381 S.E.2d 126, 127 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (the jurisdictional limitation on adjudication of a clergy-denomination 
lawsuit applied even if the defendant did not invoke it). 
128 Johnson v. Sanders, 319 F. Supp. 421, 432 n.32 (D. Conn. 1970) (three judge court), 
aff'd, 403 U.S. 955 (1971) (Establishment Clause limitations are not subject to waiver).  See also 
Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 
Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1998); Lupu and Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, supra 
note XX, at 1815, 1895. 
129 EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 856 F. Supp. 1, 12-13 (D.D.C. 1994), aff’d, 83 F.3d 
455 (D.C. Cir. 1996). See our discussion of the Catholic University case, supra notes XX-XX 
and accompanying text. 
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It could turn out that in attempting to prove his case, appellant will be forced to 
inquire into matters of ecclesiastical policy even as to his contract claim.  Of 
course, in that situation, a court may grant summary judgment on the ground that 
appellant has not proved his case and pursuing the matter further would create an 
excessive entanglement with religion.130 
 If a court can resolve a contract dispute without adjudicating questions about the 
minister’s performance in the role, then the Establishment Clause imposes no bar.131  The 
necessary elements of Minker’s contract claim, including his suitability for call and the 
availability of appropriate placements, certainly suggest that religious issues were likely to be 
raised in any subsequent litigation.  Adjudication of those religious issues is not inevitable.  In 
discovery, the religious body might have stipulated to Minker’s suitability and the availability of 
placements.  But if those issues were controverted, the court would have no authority to resolve 
the suit, and Minker’s claim could not proceed. 
2. Justiciable claims 
 The second set of examples involves issues to which adjudicate disability should not 
attach, even though the issues arise from disputes between congregations and their ministers. 
                                                 
130 Minker, 894 F.2d 1360. 
131 Leavy v. Congregation Beth Shalom, 490 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1025-28 (N.D. Iowa 
2007) (limited jurisdiction over clergy breach of contract claims does not extend to adjudication 
of issues of ministerial performance).  See also El-Farra v. Sayyed, 365 Ark. 209 (Ark. 2006) (no 
jurisdiction over alleged breach of contract, where adjudication would involve assessment of 
plaintiff’s role as religious leader). 
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 Example D: Who is a minister?  Defendant congregation hired the plaintiff as 
“Minister for Administration,” with duties that included oversight of the church’s 
property, supervision of custodial and secretarial staff, and general office management.  
After several disputes with the congregation council, plaintiff was fired.  Plaintiff claimed 
that the firing breached his employment contract with the church, and also constituted 
age-based discrimination.  Invoking the ministerial exception, the congregation moved to 
dismiss the lawsuit.  Plaintiff denied that he was a ministerial employee, and the 
congregation argued that its determination of who is a minister is itself protected by the 
ministerial exception.132 
 On the surface, the decision about who is a minister seems little different from decisions 
about the qualifications for ministry or performance of the clerical role.  All involve the religious 
community’s definition of ministry.  If the purpose of the ministerial exception were to protect 
the autonomy of religious organizations, there would be little reason for distinguishing among 
these decisions.  Once a religious organization sincerely professed that a particular role was 
ministerial, courts acting on an autonomy-based theory would be precluded from scrutinizing 
employment disputes arising from that role. 
                                                 
132 The leading case on the definition of “minister” under the ministerial exception is 
EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981).  See also Rayburn v. General 
Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168-69 (4th Cir. 1985); Starkman v. 
Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 175-77 (5th Cir. 1999); Archdiocese of Washington v. Moersen, 399 Md. 
637, 925 A.2d 659 (Md. Ct. App. 2007), cert. denied, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 1337 (U.S., Feb. 19, 
2008). 
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 If, however, the ministerial exception is grounded in Establishment Clause limits on 
government jurisdiction over particular questions, the decision about who is a minister turns out 
to be quite different from decisions about clergy qualifications or performance.  Seen through the 
lens of the Establishment Clause, the ministerial exception insures that the government’s power 
is not directly employed to promote or impede particular religious doctrines.  Decisions about 
clergy qualifications or performance fall within that category; but decisions about which 
positions fall within the ministerial exception do not.  This distinction may be counterintuitive, 
but it is important and illuminates core aspects of our Establishment Clause-based understanding 
of the ministerial exception. 
 By classifying a position as ministerial, the court is not deciding which roles deserve the 
religious title of “minister,” or who is fit to be ordained, or how performance in the role of clergy 
should be measured.133  Instead, the court’s classification serves only the government’s interest 
in avoiding impermissible judgments.  From that perspective, the court asks which positions 
involve the kinds of assessments that courts should be forbidden to make.134  If the position does 
not require the court to determine whether an employee has adequately promulgated the church’s 
message, or is qualified to teach that message, then the ministerial exception should not apply.  
In other words, the court has general jurisdiction to decide whether it has particular jurisdiction 
with respect to questions raised in a dispute between congregations and their employees.  The 
congregation’s decision to label a position as “ministerial” or to limit the position to ordained 
                                                 
133 Moersen, 925 A.2d 659, 668-69. 
134 Id. at 669-677 (reviewing case law distinguishing between functions of ministerial and 
non-ministerial employees). 
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candidates will be relevant to the court’s determination, but the congregation’s view should not 
preclude the court from making an independent judgment about the position at issue. 
 Moreover, permitting judicial determination of which positions are “ministerial” is 
conceptually no different from the official application of definitions of “religion” or “minister” 
found throughout the law, including the very definition of religion under the Religion Clauses.  
Federal tax law decides which organizations are “religious” and thus qualify for exemption,135 
and which religious leaders are “ministers of the gospel” and may thus exclude their housing 
allowance from earned income.136  The law of evidence determines who may be considered 
clergy for purposes of the priest-penitent privileges.137  Public school boards and courts must 
decide which courses or exercises are religious, and thus ineligible for official sponsorship in 
schools.138  In each of these contexts, the government’s definition is based on secular and 
                                                 
135 Church Of the Chosen People (North American Panarchate) v. The United States of 
America, 548 F. Supp. 1247, 1252-53 (D. Minn. 1982).  See also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 
36993 (Feb. 3, 1977). 
136 26 USCS § 107. See also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Parsonage Exemption Violates the 
Establishment Clause and Should Be Declared Unconstitutional, 24 Whittier L. Rev. 707 (2003). 
137 People v. Carmona, 82 N.Y.2d 603, 606 N.Y.S.2d 879, 627 N.E.2d 959 (1993). 
138 See, e.g., Doe v. Porter, 188 F. Supp. 2d 904 (E.D. Tenn. 2002), aff’d, 370 F.3d 558 
333 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that Bible classes conducted in public schools violated the 
Establishment Clause because content of instruction was devotional); Gibson v. Lee County 
Sch. Bd., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1426 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (partially granting an injunction based on an 
Establishment Clause challenge to curriculum of Bible history courses in public schools).  See 
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functional concerns, which may differ among contexts, rather than a desire to promote a 
particular theological view.  For example, the definition of clergy under the evidentiary privilege 
is designed to protect the reasonable expectations of those who communicate with religious 
leaders.139  The definition of “religious” within the tax code is intended to protect against 
fraudulent efforts to avoid tax liability.140 
 In Example D, the court should reject the congregation’s claim that its classification of 
the employee as a minister resolves the question.  To invoke the ministerial exception, the 
congregation will need to show why adjudication of the employment claim would require the 
court to exercise authority over the congregation’s religious message.141  It is possible, of course, 
that the “Minister for Administration” has responsibility for promulgation of such a message.  
His duties may include substantive judgments about the content of worship or supervision of 
employees engaged in religious teaching.  It is equally possible that his position involves no such 
duties, and the characterization of his job as “ministerial” results from the congregation’s desire 
to elevate all positions of responsibility to equal status.142  Although the congregation is free to 
                                                                                                                                                             
generally, Lupu and Tuttle, The Cross at College, supra note XX, at XX. 
139 People v. Carmona, 82 N.Y.2d 603, 606 N.Y.S.2d 879, 627 N.E.2d 959 (1993). 
140 Church Of the Chosen People (North American Panarchate) v. The United States of 
America, 548 F. Supp. 1247, 1252-53 (D. Minn. 1982).  See also Church of Gospel Ministry, 
Inc. v. United States, 640 F. Supp. 96 (D.D.C. 1986), aff’d 830 F2d 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
141 Miller v. Bay View United Methodist Church, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1181-83 (W.D. 
Wisc. 2001). 
142 It is also possible that the congregation is trying to immunize all of its employment 
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confer titles and status as it chooses, those decisions do not mean that the Establishment Clause 
bars courts from deciding disputes that arise from performance of a particular role.143  The 
ministerial exception limits adjudication of specific religious issues.  If those issues do not arise 
with respect to a role, then courts should not classify the position as ministerial for purposes of 
this exception. 
Example E: Who has authority to hire or fire a minister?  A pastor has been engaged in a 
long-running dispute with several of the congregation’s elders, although she enjoys the 
support of many members of the congregation.  The board of elders votes to terminate the 
pastor’s employment.  The pastor sues to enjoin enforcement of the board’s decision.  
She argues that the board failed to follow proper procedures in terminating her 
employment.  In particular, the board failed to provide her written notice of deficiencies 
in her performance, did not consult with the denominational body, and did not obtain the 
necessary two-thirds consent of the congregation before the termination.  The board 
invokes the ministerial exception and asks the court to dismiss the pastor’s claim.144 
                                                                                                                                                             
relationships from legal scrutiny.  The law of the ministerial exception should not permit, or 
create incentives for, congregations to adopt that strategy.  See Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist 
Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990) (Fair Labor Standards Act may be applied to 
nonministerial employees of religious entity); Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 
1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 2005). 
143 Moersen, 925 A.2d 659, 668-69. 
144 See Vann v. Guildfield Missionary Baptist Church, 452 F. Supp. 2d 651 (W.D. Va. 
2006) (court has jurisdiction to decide whether congregational board had authority to terminate 
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 The process-based claims in Example E pose a slightly different set of questions from 
those raised in the first four examples.  In important respects, the inquiry reflected in this 
example comes closest to the congregational property disputes discussed earlier.145  Judicial 
resolution of these claims would require scrutiny of congregational documents, including the 
corporate charter, constitution, bylaws, and perhaps even the employment manual and the 
pastor’s contract.  Because not all congregations would have such documents, or congregation 
leaders may be wholly unaware that such documents define the scope of powers and 
responsibilities within the congregation, judicial resolution of the claims might also require 
scrutiny of governance and employment practices within the congregation. 
 One might argue that scrutiny of congregational documents and practices threatens to 
entangle courts in congregations’ relationships with clergy, so such scrutiny should be barred by 
the ministerial exception.  But application of the ministerial exception depends on the specific 
questions that the court would be required to answer, not the extent to which the inquiry intrudes 
on the congregation.  In this example, the plaintiff-pastor has asked the court to resolve two 
distinct issues: which body within the congregation had the authority to terminate her call, and 
what process she was entitled to receive prior to termination. 
 Both issues depend on judicial interpretation of the congregation’s documents and 
practices, but that similarity masks an important difference.  The first issue focuses on whether 
the congregation has acted; the second focuses on the quality of that action and, by extension, the 
character of the congregation’s relationship with the pastor.  To resolve the first question, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
minister). 
145 See supra notes XX-XX and accompanying text. 
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court would need to decide how the religious body allocates decision-making authority.146  That 
allocation is certainly thick with religious significance, and has driven schisms and even wars in 
the past.147  Civil jurisdiction over the question, however, does not depend on a normative 
resolution by courts of contested religious positions.  Instead, the court is asked to enforce only 
the allocation of power that the congregation has already adopted.148  Rather than imposing a 
                                                 
146 Vann v. Guildfield Missionary Baptist Church, 452 F. Supp. 2d 651, 655-56 (W.D. 
Va. 2006). 
147 In Christianity, the split between congregational and hierarchical church governance 
generally reflects much deeper theological divisions about sources of authority, specifically the 
extent to which the church stands between the believer and God – and thus bears divine authority 
– or whether the believer and God are in immediate relationship, connected through scripture and 
prayer.  In traditions that focus on the immediate relationship between God and believer, church 
polity tends to be congregational, with authority of the church derived from the consent of the 
believers.  The struggle between Anglicans and Puritans in sixteenth and seventeenth century 
England provides a vivid example of the deep and violent conflicts that can arise over patterns of 
ecclesiastical authority.  See generally Peter Lake, Anglicans and Puritans? Presbyterianism and 
English Conformist Thought from Whitgift to Hooker (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988); Joan 
Lockwood O’Donovan, Theology of Law and Authority in the English Reformation 109-53 
(Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1991).  
148 Vann, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 656.  Poesnecker v. Ricchio, 631 A.2d 1097, 1103-04 (Pa. 
Commw. 1993) (court has jurisdiction to decide whether removal of religious leader was the 
result of a legitimate decision by the religious body). 
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resolution on the congregation, the court’s exercise of jurisdiction protects and implements the 
congregation’s own polity.  Failure to extend that protection would effectively consign religious 
bodies to anarchy, as the will of those who hold constitutional authority within a congregation 
could be thwarted by those who aggressively seized power and acted without lawful authority.149 
 Judicial enforcement of a congregation’s allocation of authority can be distinguished 
from enforcement of contracts with ministers.  We argued earlier that the voluntary consent of 
parties does not eliminate the Establishment Clause limits on civil jurisdiction.150  Thus, the mere 
fact that a congregation has formally adopted a particular authority structure does not give the 
court power to enforce that structure.  In a breach of contract case, the court lacks jurisdiction if 
resolving the claim would require it to assess the plaintiff’s qualifications or performance as 
minister.  The challenge to the board’s authority in Example E requires no such assessment.  The 
court would only need to decide whether the congregation’s governing documents gave the 
board the power to terminate a pastor, or assigned that power to the congregation as a whole.  If 
the court determined that the board lacked that power, the congregation would remain free 
thereafter to give that power to the board, or to terminate the pastor itself.  Importantly, the court 
would not review the decision to terminate the pastor; it would only have jurisdiction to decide 
whether the board was the appropriate body to make that decision. 
 Justiciability of the second type of issue in Example E – requirements of denominational 
                                                 
149 Higgins v. Maher, 210 Cal.App.3d 1168, 1173 (1989) (quoting Laycock, Towards a 
General Theory of the Religion Clauses, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1373, 1413 (1981)).  See also Vann, 
452 F. Supp. 2d at 656. 
150 Supra notes XX-XX and accompanying text. 
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consultation or written notice of deficiency – represents a more difficult question.  Some 
procedures may be intertwined with the allocation of authority.  For example, the congregation’s 
constitution may require particular forms and timing of notice for a congregational meeting, and 
failure to provide the required notice would seriously undermine the validity of decisions 
reached at such a meeting.151  Lack of notice is likely to mean that “the congregation” was not 
given an adequate opportunity to exercise its authority at that meeting. 
 However, the notice and consultation procedures invoked by the pastor in Example E 
involve the quality of decision-making, not the allocation of decision-making authority.  The 
congregation’s employment procedures, such as the duty to provide the pastor with written 
notice of any deficiencies, are not readily separable from the congregation’s evaluation of the 
pastor’s performance.152  A requirement of written notice implies a notice adequate to inform the 
                                                 
151 Vincent v. Raglin, 114 Mich. App. 242; 318 N.W.2d 629 (1982); Org. for Preserving 
the Constitution of Zion Lutheran Church v. Mason, 49 Wn. App. 441, 445, 743 P.2d 848 (1987) 
(court has jurisdiction to decide legitimacy of congregational vote to hire pastor). 
152 Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (courts may not 
review alleged arbitrariness of church decisions regarding ecclesiastical officials).  See also 
Hutchison v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1986); Young v. Northern Ill. Conference of 
United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 1994); Knuth v. Lutheran Church Missouri 
Synod, 643 F. Supp. 444 (D. Kan. 1986); Jacobs v. Mallard Creek Presbyterian Church, Inc., 214 
F. Supp. 2d 552 (W.D.N.C. 2002); Baker v. African Methodist Episcopal Church, 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 13429 (N.D. Tex. July 23, 2002) (court may not adjudicate claim that church failed 
to follow internal procedures in termination of pastor). 
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pastor of the relevant concerns and, perhaps, to permit her to respond.  Similarly, a requirement 
of consultation with the denominational body implies adequate consultation – that is, a flow of 
information and judgment sufficient to fulfill the purposes to be served by the consultation 
requirement.  Judicial appraisal of the adequacy of the notice to the pastor or the sufficiency of 
the consultation with the denominational body, however, may force the reviewing court to decide 
questions of religious significance.  Thus for the same reasons that the court lacks jurisdiction to 
review the substance of the decision, the court would also lack jurisdiction to review the process 
by which that decision is reached.153  As long as the appropriate body makes the decision, the 
court should not look behind that body’s judgment. 
 Example F: Breach of contract - unpaid wages.  An imam was hired as religious 
leader of a mosque.  The imam’s employment contract provides a salary that is paid at the 
end of each month.  The arrangement went well for several years, but a serious 
disagreement arose last month.  At the end of the month, the mosque’s board of directors 
informed the imam that it would not pay his salary for the past month because of 
weaknesses in his leadership and teaching.  The board has not discharged the imam, and 
he continues to perform his duties.  But the imam files a lawsuit, seeking payment for his 
services over the past month.154 
                                                 
153 Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724-25(1976). 
154 Goodman v. Temple Shir Ami, 712 So. 2d 775 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1998) 
(court permitted rabbi to assert his claim for back wages, but dismissed his claims of defamation 
and breach of contract).  See also Jenkins v. Trinity Lutheran Church, 356 Ill. App. 3d 504 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2005). 
  
60
 This example involves an issue similar to the breach of contract claim addressed in 
Example C.  In both, the religious body claims to have taken action against a ministerial 
employee based on evaluation of the employee’s performance.  We argued that the ministerial 
exception should bar adjudication of the claim in Example C, but we think the claim in Example 
F merits different treatment. 
 As with the previous examples, application of the ministerial exception depends on the 
specific issue that the court is asked to resolve.  In a claim for back wages, the court would not 
be required to second-guess the board’s evaluation of the imam’s performance.  Under ordinary 
employment law standards, an employee is entitled to wages for time worked even if the 
employee has performed poorly during that time period.155  Unless the employment contract 
                                                 
155 See, e.g., Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth & Co., L.P., 344 F.3d 184 (2nd Cir. 2003); 
E. H. Crump Company of Georgia, Inc. et al. v. Millar, 194 Ga. App. 687, 391 S.E.2d 775 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1990); Cameco, Inc. v. Gedicke, 157 N.J. 504, 724 A.2d 783 (1999).  The amount owed 
by the employer would also include benefits, such as severance pay or accumulated leave, that 
are attributable to time already worked by the employee.  See Gipe v. Superior Court of Orange 
County, 124 Cal. App. 3d 617, 177 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1981) (severance pay); Pearson v. Church of 
God, 325 S.C. 45, 478 S.E.2d 849 (1996) (pension benefits).  This would also encompass a 
contractual obligation to provide the plaintiff with a period of notice before termination.  If the 
congregation did not provide that notice, a court would not order the plaintiff reinstated for that 
period, but the court could require the congregation to pay the plaintiff’s wages during that 
period.  See Salzgaber v. First Christian Church, 65 Ohio App. 3d 368, 583 N.E.2d 1361 (Ohio 
Ct. App., Ross County 1989).  
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makes payment expressly contingent on a particular quality of performance, the employer’s 
remedies for poor performance do not include denial or reduction of past wages.156  The 
employer may discipline or discharge the employee, or offer future employment at a different 
salary, but the employer may not unilaterally withhold pay.157 
 The sole exception to this rule excuses employers from paying “faithless servants,” 
defined as employees who have breached their duty of loyalty to the employer.158  While that 
category would encompass a minister who embezzled congregational funds, it does not cover 
disagreements about the quality of services performed. 
 Therefore, the ministerial exception does not bar the imam from establishing a claim for 
back wages.  To prevail, he must prove that he was entitled to receive a specific wage for the 
                                                 
156 Williams v. Crane, 153 Mich. 89; 116 N.W. 554 (1908) (former employee has right to 
recover compensation for services performed, even if employee fails to work for entire contract 
term).  See also Michigan Law and Practice, Employment, Ch. 3, § 15 (2007) (deductions and 
forfeitures of employees’ back wages).  If a minister’s employment contract provided for 
benefits payable at the end of the minister’s service, but such benefits were conditioned on the 
minister’s performance, a court would not have jurisdiction to evaluate the congregation’s 
decision not to pay such benefits.  See Kraft v. Rector, Churchwardens & Vestry of Grace 
Church, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4234, *19-*20 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2004). 
157 Mary Babb Morris, Compensation of employee rightfully discharged, 27 Am Jur 2d 
Employment Relationship § 72 (2008). 
158 Restatement 3d of Agency, § 8.01(d)(2).  See also Tory A. Weigand, Employee Duty 
of Loyalty and the Doctrine of Forfeiture, 42 Boston Bar J. 6, 21-22 (1998). 
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period, that he actually performed the duties expected under his contract, and that the wage was 
not paid.159  None of those elements requires the court to determine a normative standard for the 
ministerial office.  Even the imam’s proof of performance avoids a constitutionally prohibited 
inquiry because it focuses only on the factual question of whether the imam carried out the 
required tasks.  It does not require assessment of how well he performed.  We recognize that any 
list of a cleric’s duties may be contested, but questions about denial of back pay should turn on 
the different and likely much simpler question of whether the cleric was working on behalf of the 
congregation.  If the work includes tasks that are appropriate, the cleric deserves to be paid.   
Only if the cleric was not working on behalf of the congregation should the congregation be free 
to withhold that portion of his wages.  Of course, the employer may correct the proportion of 
time an employee spends on particular tasks, and discipline or discharge an employee for 
improper allocation of time. 
 Jurisdiction to adjudicate back pay disputes does not imply jurisdiction over all wage 
claims by ministerial employees.  Courts have uniformly and correctly dismissed attempts by 
ministers to invoke the protections of wage and hour legislation.160  Such legislation imposes 
                                                 
159 Dobrota v. Free Serbian Orthodox Church, 191 Ariz. 120, 126 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998); 
Gipe v. Superior Court of Orange County, 124 Cal. App. 3d 617, 177 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1981);  
Houseman v. Summit Christian Sch., 762 So. 2d 979, 980 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2000) 
(retirement benefits); Jenkins v. Trinity Lutheran Church, 356 Ill. App. 3d 504 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2005). 
160 Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2008); Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew 
Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 2004), rehearing en banc denied by 
  
63
minimum wage and overtime pay requirements,161 and the Supreme Court has held that religious 
entities may be required to comply with such restrictions in the employment of non-ministerial 
workers.162  However, application of those standards to the relationship between a religious body 
and its minister implicates the core concerns of the ministerial exception.  The Fair Labor 
Standards Act and similar state legislation define the minimum terms of any covered 
employment relationship.  But the ministerial exception limits the power of the state to specify 
the content of the clerical office or the relationship between cleric and congregation.  Even 
something as apparently innocuous as a minimum wage requirement would reshape the 
relationship between a congregation and a cleric who is bound by a vow of poverty.163  Wage 
and hour standards impose a normative vision on the ministerial relationship, however modest 
that vision might be.  By contrast, enforcement of a back wage obligation only requires the 
congregation to honor its agreement to pay for work that it has already received.164 
                                                                                                                                                             
Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 369 F.3d 797 (4th Cir. 2004). 
161 Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. 
162 Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).  See 
also Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990); Elbaz v. Congregation 
Beth Judea, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Ill. 1992).  
163 Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 476-77.  
164 Bodewes v. Zuroweste, 15 Ill. App. 3d 101, 103-04 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1973).  See 
also McManus v. Taylor, 521 So. 2d 449, 451 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988) (former pastor may 
proceed with claim that he provided uncompensated labor and materials for construction of 
church property). 
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3. Hard cases 
 Compared to the first two sets of examples, the final set involves more complicated and 
less certain applications of the ministerial exception. 
 Example G: Defamation.  The minister of a congregation had a long history of 
personal animosity with the bishop of that congregation’s regional body.  The bishop 
received an anonymous allegation of sexual misconduct by the minister, and confronted 
the pastor with the allegation.  The pastor denied that he committed the alleged acts, but 
the bishop still launched an investigation, as the rules of that denomination permit.  The 
bishop met with the congregation and informed them of the allegation, and asked 
members to tell him whether any of them had witnessed similar acts of misconduct by the 
minister.  Following his investigation, the bishop wrote a memorandum to the 
congregation’s board of elders, in which he concluded that “your minister has been 
sexually promiscuous, unfaithful to his wife, and has abused his authority within the 
church.”  The bishop recommended that the congregation terminate the minister’s 
employment, and he also stated that he would bring disciplinary action under the 
denomination’s rules.  The board of elders mailed the bishop’s report to all members of 
the congregation.  Despite the minister’s claim of innocence and offer to present evidence 
to support that claim, the congregation terminated the pastor without conducting an 
independent investigation or review of the bishop’s conclusions.  The bishop distributed a 
report of the congregation’s decision to other bishops in that denomination, and thus the 
minister has been effectively barred from receiving another position within the 
denomination.  The bishop did not bring disciplinary charges within the denomination, so 
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the minister has not been allowed an opportunity to respond to the charges.  The minister 
has sued his former congregation, the bishop, and the national denomination for 
defamation; the defendants have all invoked the ministerial exception.165 
 The minister’s claims of defamation generate a series of interlocked hard cases under the 
ministerial exception because the claims provoke two contrary intuitions.  From one perspective, 
the ministers claims seem to be a collateral attack on a decision that is otherwise solidly 
protected by the ministerial exception.  By challenging the veracity of allegations made in the 
process of evaluating and then terminating his appointment, the minister is asking the court to 
review the merits of the congregation’s decision.  Such claims typically do not involve disputes 
over questions of publicly verifiable fact, such as whether a minister has been convicted of a 
criminal offense.  Instead, the allegedly defamatory statements usually incorporate some implied 
conclusion drawn from facts.166  For example, if a pastor is accused of “sexual misconduct,” the 
accusation incorporates not merely an assertion about a particular act, such as extra-marital 
intercourse, but also the religious community’s normative understanding of sexuality.167 
                                                 
165 Hiles v. Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 437 Mass. 505, 773 N.E.2d 929 (Mass. 2002). 
166 Horne v. Andrews, 264 Ga. App. 145, 146-47, 589 S.E.2d 719, 721-22 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2003). 
167 Van Tran v. Fiorenza, 934 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 1996) (court 
could not determine whether plaintiff had been excommunicated); Jeambey v. Synod of Lakes & 
Prairies, Presbyterian Church, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 1310 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 1995).  
See also Downs v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 683 A.2d 808, 624 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) 
(“Questions of truth, falsity, malice, and the various privileges that exist often take on a different 
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 But not all tort claims by ministers would constitute a collateral attack on an adverse job 
action.  For example, the ministerial exception would not deprive a minister of the right to sue 
for assault simply because the assault occurred during the course of his employment.  For one 
who has been defamed, the injury to reputation and dignity can cause just as much suffering as 
the physical injury that results from an assault.  Malicious statements can deprive someone of 
their livelihood and family, and leave no opportunity to reclaim personal dignity other than civil 
litigation.  When a remedy for that harm would not inevitably lead a court into impermissible 
inquiries, the court should be receptive to the claim. 
 Nearly all courts that have considered the question have ruled that the ministerial 
exception bars adjudication of defamation cases involving clergy and their congregations.168  But 
most of these decisions emphasized the congregation’s autonomy under the Free Exercise 
Clause, and stressed the importance of the religious body’s interest in unfettered choice of a 
                                                                                                                                                             
hue when examined in the light of religious precepts and procedures that generally permeate 
controversies over who is fit to represent and speak for the church”). 
168 Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 720 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Klouda v. 
Southwestern Baptist Theol. Seminary, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22157 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 
2008); Jae-Woo Cha v. Korean Presbyterian Church, 262 Va. 604 (Va. 2001); Nevius v. Afr. 
Inland Mission Int'l, 511 F. Supp. 2d 114 (D.D.C. 2007); Yaggie v. Indiana-Kentucky Synod 
Evangelical Lutheran Church in Am., 860 F. Supp. 1194 (W.D. Ky. 1994); Trice v. Burress, 
2006 OK CIV APP 79, 137 P.3d 1253 (Okla. Ct. App. 2006); but see Marshall v. Munro, 845 
P.2d 424 (Alaska 1993) (pastor can proceed with defamation claim against church official) 
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minister.169 
 Despite the general agreement among these decisions, the free exercise calculus is 
questionable.  Like all other employers, religious organizations would be able to invoke 
important legal privileges and defenses in response to a minister’s defamation claim.170  Given 
those protections, potential liability for ministerial defamation claims may not represent a 
“substantial burden” on a religious organization.  Although the possibility of civil litigation is 
certainly burdensome, courts have not considered that risk sufficient by itself to constitute a 
substantial burden on religious exercise.  If liability for ministerial defamation does impose such 
a burden, it must be found in the defendant’s obligation to show that the challenged statement is 
truthful or otherwise privileged.  But judicial scrutiny of a particular statement’s veracity need 
not be especially burdensome.  The court would only need to ask whether a statement was, in 
fact, made, and if so, whether the statement was truthful.171  By requiring that publication of facts 
must be done in good faith, the inquiry might chill a religious group’s communication about its 
leadership, but the chilling of malicious statements in any context is unlikely to be regarded as a 
net social loss. 
 An approach grounded in the Establishment Clause provides a clearer understanding of 
the problem with adjudicating ministerial defamation cases.  By focusing on the court’s role in 
adjudication rather than the burden that judicial scrutiny imposes on the congregation, the 
Establishment Clause inquiry directs attention to the main concern of the ministerial exception: 
                                                 
169 [CITE NEEDED] 
170 [CITE NEEDED] 
171 Marshall v. Munro, 845 P.2d 424, 428 (Alaska 1993). 
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whether the government action effectively asserts control over the qualifications for or 
performance of ministry.  Using this approach, defamation claims should be divided into two 
components, the alleged act of defamation and the injury caused by that act.  Jurisdiction in 
ministerial defamation cases depends on the plaintiff’s ability to show that both the defamatory 
act and the resulting injury can be disentangled from the religious body’s evaluation of 
ministerial performance.172  If both act and injury can be separated from the religious body’s 
evaluative process, then and only to that extent, the defamation claim should be justiciable. 
 Two decided cases help to clarify this understanding of ministerial defamation claims.  In 
Farley v. Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod,173 a denomination had employed a minister to 
develop a new congregation.  The denomination later determined that the congregation was not 
viable and the minister lacked the skills necessary to succeed in that context, so the denomination 
ended its funding for the project and thus terminated the minister’s employment.174  The minister 
                                                 
172 See Hiles v. Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 437 Mass. 505, 512-15 (Mass. 2002) 
(adjudication of defamation claim by minister requires assessment of context in which statement 
was made and remedy that plaintiff seeks for the alleged injury).  See also Callahan v. First 
Congregational Church of Haverhill, 441 Mass. 699, 715-17 (Mass. 2004) (defamation claim 
may proceed for statements that may have occurred outside the context of evaluating minister’s 
performance, but not for statements made within that context); Jackson v. Presbytery of 
Susquehanna Valley, 179 Misc. 2d 704 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (defamation claim barred because it 
was intertwined with evaluation of plaintiff’s fitness for ministry). 
173 821 F.Supp. 1286 (D. Minn. 1993). 
174 Id. at 1287.     
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alleged that the denomination’s statements about his competence were defamatory.  The minister 
claimed that he was capable of performing the work of starting a new congregation, and the 
denomination’s statements to the contrary were false and malicious.175  Invoking the ministerial 
exception, the court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment.176  The court concluded 
that adjudication of the claim would require it to scrutinize the denomination’s process and 
standard for evaluating the plaintiff’s performance.177 
 In terms of the approach outlined above, the minister’s defamation claim must be barred 
because both the alleged defamatory act and the injury resulting from that act are completely 
intertwined with the denomination’s assessment of its minister.  The minister challenged the 
statements of denominational officials in their reports about the progress of the new 
congregation, and the minister claimed that he suffered loss of professional reputation and 
opportunities as a result of those statements.178 
 By contrast, in Ogle v. Hocker, 179 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
permitted a former evangelist to proceed with a defamation claim against an active minister in 
the same denomination.  In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he and the minister traveled 
together on a “ministry trip.” After the minister’s return from the trip, the minister claimed that 
                                                 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 1287-88, 1290. 
177 Id. at 1290. 
178 Id. at 1287. 
179 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 12043 (6th Cir., May 29, 2008). 
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the plaintiff had made several overt homosexual advances to him.180  The minister allegedly 
made this claim in a number of contexts, including a letter to the presiding bishop of the church 
body to which he and the plaintiff-evangelist both belonged; several different sermons that he 
preached soon after his return from the trip; and conversations with several other people who 
appear not to have been involved in church governance.181  The defendant minister invoked the 
ministerial exception, but the court held that the exception did not preclude further adjudication 
of the case.182  The court reasoned that the minister had no protected interest in disseminating the 
information to those outside the church governance process.183  Indeed, even the statements 
made in the sermons might be actionable if the statements about the plaintiff were intended to 
provide a “personal life example of deception,” rather than a judgment about the plaintiff’s 
fitness for ministry.184 
 As with Farley, our approach to ministerial defamation cases helps to clarify the 
constitutional issues raised in Ogle.  In Ogle, the allegedly defamatory acts included defendant’s 
statements to church leadership, his sermon references to plaintiff, and comments to other 
                                                 
180 Id. at *2-*5. 
181 Id. at *4-*5, *12-*14. 
182 Id. at *14.  The plaintiff’s action against the religious denomination was dismissed on 
ministerial exception grounds.  Ogle v. Church of God, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25592 (E.D. 
Tenn. Sept. 9, 2004), affirmed, Ogle v. Church of God, 153 Fed. Appx. 371 (6th Cir. 2005). 
183 Ogle, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 12043, at *12-*14 (6th Cir., May 29, 2008). 
184 Id. at *13. 
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individuals.185  The ministerial exception would bar adjudication of the defamatory character of 
statements to church leaders, but would not prevent adjudication of statements to those outside 
the church, for whom the information bears no relationship to questions of a minister’s fitness.186  
The defendant’s statements in his sermons are more difficult to categorize, but the court rightly 
suggests that scrutiny of those statements must focus on the defendant’s intentions.187  If the 
defendant intended to inform the congregation about plaintiff’s qualifications as a minister, then 
the ministerial exception should apply.188  But if the speaker had a different intent, the message 
does not implicate relevant constitutional concerns. 
 To prevail, the plaintiff in Ogle would also need to show that his alleged injury can be 
disentangled from the denomination’s evaluative process.189  The Sixth Circuit’s opinion does 
not address this issue, but the problem is likely to arise in further adjudication of the case.  The 
                                                 
185 Id. at *3-*5. 
186 See also Ausley v. Shaw, 193 S.W.3d 892 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (former minister’s 
defamation claim against congregation leaders can proceed because challenged statements 
occurred outside church setting). 
187 Ogle, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 12043, at *11-*14.  
188 See, e.g., Bourne v. Ctr. on Children, Inc., 154 Md. App. 42 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2003) (court lacked jurisdiction to decide case involving denomination’s assessment of 
candidate’s fitness for ordination). 
189 Jae-Woo Cha v. Korean Presbyterian Church, 262 Va. 604, 615 (Va. 2001), Ausley v. 
Shaw, 193 S.W.3d 892, 895.  See also State ex rel. Gaydos v. Blaeuer, 81 S.W.3d 186, 196-98 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2002).  
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defendant’s statements apparently cost the plaintiff his employment and clerical status within 
 the church, but that injury would not be justiciable under our view of the ministerial exception.  
If, however, the plaintiff could show mental anguish from public humiliation that was traceable 
to the statements, or injury to personal relationships, those injuries should be justiciable. 
 In Example G, plaintiff would allege that he was defamed by the bishop’s statements to 
the congregation, the bishop’s letter to other denominational bishops, and the congregation board 
of elder’s letter to congregation members.  He would claim injury from his loss of employment 
and professional opportunities, and perhaps also mental anguish and harm to his marital 
relationship.  The defendants should prevail under the ministerial exception, because each of the 
allegedly defamatory statements occurred within the religious body’s process for supervision of 
clergy.190  Even if the statements were false, or the bishop failed to follow proper procedures in 
investigating the claim, judicial scrutiny of the statements would inevitably require a court to 
establish normative criteria for evaluation of clergy.  For example, if the plaintiff alleged that he 
did not commit “sexual misconduct” as alleged by the bishop, the court could only resolve the 
dispute by making a determination of the denomination’s view of inappropriate and appropriate 
                                                 
190 On this analysis, Marshall v. Munro was wrongly decided.  The case involved a 
pastor’s claim that a church official defamed him by communicating false information to a 
congregation.  Although the information at issue – his marital status and past disciplinary record 
– was not religious in character, it was allegedly communicated as part of the church official’s 
responsibilities, and the minister’s injuries were inseparable from his professional employment.  
Marshall v. Munro, 845 P.2d 424 (Alaska 1993). 
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sexual conduct.191  In the context of pastoral evaluation, individual facts cannot be isolated from 
the religious body’s interpretation of those facts.  The plaintiff might be able to show that some 
aspects of the harm – such as damage to his marital relationship – are disconnected from 
evaluation of his pastoral fitness, but adjudication of the claim requires that both the allegedly 
wrongful act and the injury must be separable from such evaluation. 
 Example H: Sexual Harassment.  A (male) and B (female) are employed as rabbis 
on the staff of the same synagogue.  B accuses A, her supervisor, of making sexual 
advances and then giving her a negative performance evaluation when she refused those 
advances.  Based on Rabbi A’s negative performance evaluations, the synagogue 
terminates Rabbi B’s employment.  She files suit against Rabbi A and the congregation, 
alleging sexual harassment and retaliation; the defendants invoke the ministerial 
exception.192 
 In sharp contrast to courts’ assessment of defamation claims brought by clergy, nearly all 
courts that have considered sexual harassment claims by clergy have found the claims 
justiciable.193  Two reasons explain courts’ refusal to apply the ministerial exception to sexual 
                                                 
191 See Hiles v. Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 437 Mass. 505 (Mass. 2002). 
192 Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). 
193 Alcazar v. Corp. of Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92708 
(W.D. Wash. Dec. 21, 2006); Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Bollard  
v. California Province of the Society of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1999); Dolquist v. 
Heartland Presbytery, 342 F.Supp.2d 996 (D. Kan. 2004); Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 
375 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2004) McKelvey v. Pierce, 173 N.J. 26, 800 A.2d 840 (N.J. 2002); 
  
74
harassment cases.  First, as with most cases involving the ministerial exception, courts have 
tended to approach the problem as a conflict between the religious body’s free exercise interest 
in autonomy and the minister’s interest in protection against the alleged injury.194  Using that 
analysis, the balance in a sexual harassment action tilts heavily toward the minister.  As these 
courts invariably determine, receptivity to sexual advances is not an element of any religious 
body’s criteria for ministry.195  Congregations have no legitimate interest in preserving a zone of 
autonomy for sexual harassment.  Moreover, the minister’s interest in avoiding sexual 
harassment is greater than employees’ ordinary interest in protection against adverse 
employment decisions.  Sexual harassment threatens an employee’s sense of privacy and perhaps 
even bodily integrity.196  Considering the respective interests of congregations and clergy, courts’ 
rejection of the autonomy-based ministerial exception is unsurprising. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Ogugua v. Archdiocese of Omaha, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23193 (D. Neb. Mar. 24, 2008). 
Weaver v. African Methodist Episcopal Church, 54 S.W.3d 575 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).  Compared 
to claims alleging defamation, there is a much smaller universe of claims by ministers alleging 
sexual harassment. 
194 See, e.g., Bollard  v. California Province of the Society of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 945-47 
(9th Cir. 1999) (applying Free Exercise Clause to sexual harassment claim by ministerial 
candidate). 
195 Bollard, 196 F.3d 940, 947.  But see Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of 
Colorado, 289 F.3d 648 (10th Cir. 2002) (sexual harassment claim dismissed because allegedly 
wrongful conduct was inseparable from doctrinal views about sexuality) 
196 Bollard, 196 F.3d 940, 948.  
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 Second, most of the sexual harassment cases involving clergy have arisen during an era 
of intense public and legal attention to sexual abuse in religious organizations.197  Courts have 
increasingly rejected constitutional defenses asserted by religious bodies to abuse-related claims, 
and jurisdictions have imposed new duties on clergy and congregations to prevent or respond to 
sexual abuse.198  That trend seems to have influenced courts’ dismissive attitude toward the 
ministerial exception in sexual harassment cases.  Like sexual abuse litigation, sexual harassment 
cases typically involve allegations of a religious body’s indifference to injury caused by the 
sexual misconduct of its agents.199  Under those circumstances, claims of the religious 
organization’s autonomy will find little support. 
 Although these two reasons make sense, they ignore a crucial aspect of sexual harassment 
claims.  Conceptually, sexual harassment is sex-based employment discrimination, not an 
assault.200  The wrongdoer subjects the victim to different terms or conditions of employment, 
                                                 
197 See, e.g., McKelvey v. Pierce, 173 N.J. 26, 49-50, 800 A.2d 840, 854-55 (N.J. 2002) 
(comparing seminarian’s sexual harassment claim to litigation over sexual misconduct by church 
leaders).  See Lupu and Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, supra note XX 
at 1790-91. 
198 See generally, Lupu and Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, 
supra note XX (describing decline of immunity for religious organizations with respect to claims 
arising from clergy sexual abuse. 
199 See, e.g., Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2004).  
200 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). 
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and does so for sexual rather than legitimate job-related reasons.201  Seen in that light, sexual 
harassment and covert discrimination claims raise identical concerns for the ministerial 
exception.  In both, the religious body disavows the discriminatory conduct at issue, and 
generally provides a permissible non-discriminatory justification for any adverse employment 
action suffered by the plaintiff.202  The plaintiff then alleges that the defendant’s justification is a 
pretext for discrimination, and the court must scrutinize the defendant’s justification.203  But if 
assessments of pretext are generally impermissible in adjudication of ministers’ covert 
discrimination claims, why should the same inquiry be permitted simply because the plaintiff 
alleges discrimination based on sexual harassment? 
 Thus far, courts have avoided a direct answer to that question because of the procedural 
posture of the clergy sexual harassment cases.  All of the reported decisions involve adjudication 
of claims at an early stage in the litigation, with nearly all coming in response to defendants’ 
motions to dismiss.204  As with the D.C. Circuit’s analysis of the breach of contract claims in 
Minker,205 the decisions on sexual harassment claims involving clergy resolve only the question 
                                                 
201 Id. 
202 See, e.g., Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 717 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (congregation 
claimed that discharge was justified by minister’s deficient performance). 
203 [NEED CITE] 
204 See, e.g., Bollard., 196 F.3d 940, 944-45; Dolquist v. Heartland Presbytery, 342 
F.Supp.2d 996 D. Kan. 2004); Ogugua v. Archdiocese of Omaha, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23193 
(D. Neb. Mar. 24, 2008)  
205 Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 
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of whether ministerial employees are categorically barred from bringing that cause of action.   
Further adjudication of the claim must confront the same issues raised by other actions related to 
clergy employment.206 
 In addressing those issues, courts are not likely to receive much help from an 
understanding of the ministerial exception based on a theory of church autonomy.  That approach 
will lead only to a balancing of respective interests, or a judgment about whether the necessary 
scrutiny will “excessively entangle” the court in the religious affairs of the organization.  Efforts 
at interest balancing and inquiries into entanglement, however, fail to capture the real 
constitutional concerns at issue in clergy employment litigation.  To protect the Establishment 
Clause values we outlined above, adjudication of sexual harassment claims must avoid judicial 
imposition of normative standards for the qualification or performance of clergy.207 
 In Example H, the plaintiff would need to show that the injury attributable to sexual 
harassment can be separated from the defendants’ evaluation of her performance and termination 
                                                                                                                                                             
1360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
206 Ogugua v. Archdiocese of Omaha, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23193 (D. Neb. Mar. 24, 
2008) (further adjudication In one sexual harassment claim brought by a minister, Elvig v. 
Ackles, the Court of Appeals of Washington granted summary judgment for defendants.  
Although the U.S. Court  of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a case involving the same facts, had 
denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Washington state court ruled that development of the 
evidence in the case made clear that further adjudication of the minister’s claim would involve 
the interests protected by the ministerial exception.  123 Wn. App. 491; 98 P.3d 524 (2004). 
207 McKelvey v. Pierce, 173 N.J. 26, 51-52, 800 A.2d 840, 856 (N.J. 2002).  
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of her position.208  Even if sex-based discrimination motivated the synagogue’s judgments, the 
ministerial exception should bar courts from scrutinizing the quality of a cleric’s job 
performance.  Rabbi B’s sexual harassment claim would need to focus on injuries directly caused 
by the harassment, such as psychological distress or interference with her marital relationship.209  
Injuries attributable to her negative evaluation and termination, including lost wages and damage 
to future professional opportunities, would not be compensable.210  Rabbi B’s retaliation claim 
should also be subjected to the same analysis.  If the retaliation by Rabbi A can be distinguished 
from his performance evaluation, then Rabbi B may be able to recover for injury attributable to 
that retaliation.  For example, Rabbi A may have retaliated by directing verbal abuse toward 
Rabbi B, but done so in a manner unrelated to performance of her office.  However, if the 
retaliation involved only the negative evaluation, the ministerial exception should bar 
adjudication of that claim. 
                                                 
208 Bollard, 196 F.3d 940, 947 (job performance of plaintiff not at issue in case). 
209 See, e.g., McKelvey, 173 N.J. at 56-57, 800 A.2d at 859.  In McKelvey, the court 
permitted the plaintiff’s claim could proceed, but ruled that the potential remedies could not 
include his losses from the denial of future employment in the church: 
However, McKelvey might, without offending First Amendment principles, seek 
money damages for the benefit defendants received from his free or reduced cost 
labor as an "intern" in various diocesan churches and, based on Auxiliary Bishop 
Schad's letter, seek an order prohibiting defendants from attempting to recoup the 
$69,000 tuition, book and fee costs.  Id. 
210 Id.   See also, Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 720 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991);  
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 The inquiry we have outlined is consistent with the approach taken by courts that have 
considered clergy sexual harassment claims.  No court has ruled that a minister may claim sexual 
harassment in challenging an adverse employment decision.  But the decided cases involving 
sexual harassment, like many other applications of the ministerial exception, provide inadequate 
explanations of why the court’s jurisdiction should be limited and how that limit should be 
implemented.  By focusing on the questions that the state may not answer – questions about 
ministerial qualifications and performance – courts would be better able to guide adjudication of 
the claims that should go forward, and avoid litigation of claims that should be barred.  If 
ministers can disentangle their injury claims from the congregation’s evaluation of their 
performance, those claims should be justiciable. 
 
 Conclusion 
 Our approach to adjudicating claims by clergy against religious entities is no doubt 
counterintuitive to many lawyers and judges.  The substance of adjudication, including 
constitutional adjudication, ordinarily is focused on rights, duties, and interests of the dueling 
parties.  Responding to deep concerns about serious injury to clergy plaintiffs, and balancing 
those concerns against the hazard of troublesome intrusion on religious entity defendants, 
somehow seems to be the substantive path along which such adjudication should proceed.  Quite 
understandably, many courts and commentators have proceeded precisely along such a path. 
 As with so much else in free exercise adjudication, however, that path leads primarily to 
arbitrary judgment, ad hoc interest balancing, and a decision pattern without true coherence.  
What we propose is quite different, although the results will at times overlap with those obtained 
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under other methodologies.   We follow the time-honored tradition in American legal thought of 
recognizing that questions about the role of courts are at the center of our political and legal 
experiment.  In particular, what we have prescribed in the pages above is designed to place 
courts firmly within the “new order for the ages” that distinguished the American constitutional 
design from its Old World predecessors.  
 The state’s authority – to legislate, to execute the laws, and to adjudicate disputes – is 
limited to secular and temporal concerns.  When adjudication between clergy and their 
employers can be limited to such concerns, the courts may perform their prescribed role.  When, 
by contrast, the evaluation of contested acts, injuries, or remedies pushes the courts into appraisal 
of who may act as the spiritual agent of others, constitutional boundaries have been crossed.   
That the task of defining and guarding those boundaries may be more subtle in this context than 
in those involving the other branches does not alter its essential character or purpose. 
